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County Administration Building
Room 310
1600 Pacific Highway
San Diego, California
October 15, 1981

CHAIID1AN ELIHU M. HARRIS: The subject of today's joint
hearing of the Assembly Judiciary and Criminal Justice Committees
is Appellate Court Efficiency.
We hope to identify whatever problems may exist in
appellate court structure, administration and practices and to
hear proposals for improving appellate court efficiency.
For a number of reasons, the caseload of California's
appellate courts has increased dramatically in recent years. We
are interested in examining programs, such as the prehearing
settlement conference, which have been instituted to deal with
the increased caseload as well as other proposals for dealing
with the problems facing our state's appellate court.
We will hear today from appellate court justices, civil
and criminal appellate practitioners and other experts in
appellate practice. Our first witness is the Honorable David
Staniforth, Justice of the Court of Appeal for the Fourth
District.
I'd like to introduce the Vice Chairman of the
Committee, Mr. Imbrecht, as well as Larry Stirling, Assemblyman
from San Diego and a menilier of the Committee. Other Committee
members should be coming in as the morning progresses, from the
Criminal Justice Committee in particular. Justice Staniforth.
JUSTICE ROBERT OLIVER STANIFORTH: My name is Robert
Oliver Staniforth and I'm Justice of the Fourth District Court of
Appeal here lor.ated in San Diego, Division 1.
I understand we're to discuss the causes and cures for
appellate r.ourt congestion.
I gather that's the nature of the
hearing. Mr. Chairman, I've always had this problem.
I'm sort
of a soft spoken judge.
I can put people in jail very readily
but it's just as effective softly as in a harsh tone.
I feel
that in attempting to look to the cures and remedies for the
problem of congestion, you first have to look and see what the
causes are at least briefly and I think you get some insight into
what can be done about.it. There's a lot of talk over the state
about what causes congestion in the trial courts and appellate
courts. But I'd like to and I have here with me today, Exhibit
1.
It's on the front page of the Los Angeles Times, the San
Diego County Section, and if you're looking for the cause of
congestion in the appellate courts, all you have to do is look at
the population, things that have happened to Southern California
in the last ten years, from 1970 to 1980. It's right there and
it indicates that we are just literally being drowned in the
sense of population growth.
This is translated into court needs
in a most dramatic manner. Let me give you some figures.
These

are dull sort of things but
in perspective if you're
congestion.
When I came
three appellate justices
District encompasses all of Southern
Angeles County and to the
, as well as
encompass Inyo County. We then had three appellate j
this District Court of Appeals, as
was then called.
that time a total of 18 trial judges in all of the s
which are encompassed within the Fourth Appellate Di
that was in 1946. Three appellate judges, 16
judges. Today, 1981, we
the Fourth
ten justices of the Court of
Five
the second district. We have a total of 122
judges in these six counties now. So that means
each appellate judge there were six superior courts
and making business for us, if that's what they do
have 12.2 superior court j
s per appel
court
district. This is productive of business. If you
matter of lawyers, in San D
County, in 1946,
some members of the county bar association.
In the f
came to be an appellate court justice, I swore
28
in San Diego County. This is done twice a year,
close to 300 lawyers. There are today more than
practicing and the ratio of lawyers to judges
judges has just increased in the same ratio that
superior court judges and appellate court judges.
population in this district tells you what has
not just population, it's the nature of population
increased our filings. We have had this enormous
people coming in -- old people --we've had a
le
different ethnic groups which have come into
into San Diego, Imperial, Orange County, and
an enormous increase
the productivity of
cases. This is a fact
just can't get
we are associated so close
to the border.
production place for var
activities. This means bus
ss
courts and the Fourth
str
looking for causes, great and small,
business of the courts, all you have to do is just
happened to us in the last 20 years and vou've
Well, among the lesser causes for this are
to say you have done to us
also things we
ourselves, the judiciary has done to
Legislature in its wisdom pas
the
it just produced an enormous amount of
courts and appellate courts.
I'm not
wisdom of it.

a
When you put
ef
flurry of trying to find out exact
enforced and I don't know
response to this whole
There was a flurry of ca
time there are sub
find that there is a respon
sense, you do it to us.
that causes business.
negligence has been on
political issue and I can
s
not want
to get involved in such a
states have resolved the
problem legislatively,
Court f
lly took
on
as a matter of a judie
enormous
If you wou
productive of trial and
iate
But
kind enough to take
off
f that sort is
the political exposure
enormous and I don't blame you at all.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS

How

we

you off

JUSTICE STANIFORTH: If you
as some of
the East have done, to take this on legislatively
have the Supreme Court to
There is not
question of contributory
but I
have defined at least 30 some or more subs
remain yet to be resolved in this area. And
resolve them by judicial case, case by case.
some
jurisdiction, I believe
's
, has
it as a legislative task. But
's enormous
problems involved and that's
you have some
people who have differing
about this question of
and assignment of responsibili
for negligence
Well,
other words, we, the courts on occas
create our
by-- it's a species of judie l activism and it's
I don't think we real
wou
pre
- at least I
feel that it we can avoid
1 activism,
take on the brunt of the

to

I'm totally in favor
, but when
's
courts just straight where you
to make a decis
do it and so it's by this process that we
come
where we are sort of s
a sea of paces,
Fourth Appellate District. Here I
a second
that's the report from
Council
of July
a
perhaps someone from the
Council
case
of
this is the last one I have
for
most
and dispositions, which would
does not have a
have a fair backlog. The Fourth
backlog of cases.
Within my own
now for assignment for

for cases
s
, we are
As soon as a case 1s
for

And
remedies
's
chairperson of
the State is one
f

they
The Chief Jus
for each just
nine. And she
fortunately, I
she assigned f
Fourth Di
two re
our presiding
from what
eight cases
author.
I
has been used
success as I hope
use them.
It's
differently but
one or two months
at the Supreme Court
take the very
the intermediate
business of writing
it's an ineff
expect to

is going
reasoning

then assign it to a lawyer, one of your research
to
and research out the dark ends and go see that your premises are
correct, to go through the trench.
These are just techniques
which do I think expedite.
In this fashion, you can
I
think a great deal more than just simply ass
expecting some month in the future to hear from
ASSEMBLYMAN CHARLES IMBRECHT: Mr. Just
, do you
that it would be useful for those kinds of techniques to be
shared? Should you have an opportunity to work with other
justices within your district?
JUSTICE STANIFORTH:
I think it would be enormous
helpful and it is done at our seminars. We do discuss
technique of opinion writing and we do discuss
s
use of the staff, of our elbow clerks, but the thing is a
aren't angels.
Each has a different quantity to contribute
I'm not saying at all that the writing of the lengthy full
scholarly type almost Supreme Court type opinion isn't proper.
I
like to do it myself and I'm accused of doing it so~etimes
I
think as an Appellate Court justice we have a more specif
j
We aim at a specific problem. We should get in and get out.
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Let me try to rephrase that.
I
guess I was trying to lead the witness in a sense but I
concern about static divisions within districts where
c
have some divisions that are not even minimally approaching the
productivity of other divisions elsewhere in the State and I have
some concern about leaving those divisions intact in e
perpetuity until there is a change in a clear professional sense
of one of those justices.
I wonder if you could comment.
I've
heard some legislation in this area in terms of providing
a
periodic, infrequent rotation if you will or change in the
membership of divisions within a given district.
JUSTICE STANIFORTH:
I think that a sort of cro s
pollination is extremely important.
I keep urging it a
on a
daily basis. For example, we have been assigned these 50 case
out of another district in the First District. We are
them.
I have worked on seven of them thus far
the
we received them.
I feel that it would he much more he
to have the people, the lawyers who are going to argue these
cases, to come to San Diego.
If we could go up and sit for a
or two or three and work with the people in the San Francisco
courts so that we could see their techniques and they could see
ours.
I have discussed this with one of the presiding just
in the First District and he's most anxious to come down and
just how the San Diego technique works. There are all sorts
techniques for expediting that we have.
For example, when I came
on the court five years ago, we had what was called a wall.
s
was a wall that had over 300 cases that were there waiting to be
tried, waiting to be heard, but we had no judges to hear
cases. We had not had an appointment to the court for more than
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a year so when I got
through with our ass
went to six and when
wall. We've got to get
to, after you've
go the wall and
out of the wall.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Our concern, at
I certainly will not attempt to
reality. Some of it is
seal.
be able to simply respond to
more justices. We went
a
the number that we did and there
reticence if you
11,
judgeships. These cost untold
in terms of staff and other attendant costs
that what we're really going to have to
very specific recommendations as to how we
scope of appellate review or
review of those matters
arguments at best, that is
the question of automatic
we should constrain to some extent,
becoming more professional
making
becoming a li~tle better at what they're
we do to maintain the structure, the
justices, we now have
84,
legislation.
I don't
that, even if your caseload
opinion. Do you have any comment
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: Wel , it was
hard place. The Judicial Council has these
many people/population
another
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
understand the legislative
caseload is going to
some very hard decisions
willing to make to this
recommendations the v1ay
speak. We'd like to do
where you've got to
would rather do the fol
That's what I'm real
you might recommend even
say it's not a good way
JUSTICE STANIFORTH:
not appropriate, the matter of
a single appeal is just
only constitutional

chopping a person off. It's a problem of due process.
does due process mean? This is a real hard problem. I
some questions in my own mind about the cutting
total
the right to appeal on a person.
I have constitutional
about any such approach to the resolution of the
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I share those concerns.

JUSTICE STANIFORTH: Secondly, it's basically not
That's the problem. A person has the need to perhaps to
least one thing.
I agree that beyond that it isn't neces
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But I'm saying that it seems to
that there ought to be the possibility of a cursory
fact there are no material errors, if in fact
basis •.•
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: We do that right now. We
under the present law and that's perhaps one of the
the Fourth District. You look at the statistics on the
what we term "by the court opinions." I think the figures
indicate we are one of the worst offenders or the best,
you look at it, in the whole State in the use of "by
These are staff prepared. These are theoretically 1
cases in which there are no great judgmental factors involved,
things which generally result in affirmance of a
1
decision.
If that's so, and it's controlled by precedent, that
no change in precedent to control it.
These are ones which can be prepared by staff,
use it, but there's a negative aspect to that type of
and that is that the Bar and the litigants generally don'
it quite as well as they like it where a judge will sign on.
They don't like this "faceless decision", as they are
And I can see why.
If I were a litigant and I had a
matter, I'd like to know there's three judicial minds.
do our best.
I think the "BC" approach is excel
and
responds directly to the questions you have. We shou
of them that way. We have another problem and that is
is a constitutional requirement that we set forth
But the question is how lengthy must you be? I know
apparently got too short in one of them here recent
the Third District and it got sent back because
didn't fulfill the constitutional requirements.
But we do have to say a few words over
with you that we don't have to write lengthy opin
s on
the cases in order to dispose of them. This is one of
secrets of the Fourth District in becoming current.
another area which you can help us is in this matter of
of staff. I don't know about increased use of the
staff, but I can see enormous possibilities in making
two lawyers I have just, well, we jumped from six to
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first of a
,
a distance for a
you. The
Chairman and
Planning Board here
all the institutions
one that did not have
analytical ana
is
Obviously the prob
from the
otherwise
scrutiny
regard.

I'm
there is indeed
element other
justice or the
element -- do
automated, have
your caseload?
colleagues s
the public
judicial
we have
processors and
can produce, or
was able to
ASSEMBLYMAN
other Elreas
just write and
pages every t
that
We have

JUSTICE STANIFORTH: Each of the distr
s
are going in our library to the microfiche type of
centralization of library and data retrieval. We are
the 20th Century in this process. The Judicial Council
us fairly carefully and periodically they do
professional groups to come in
study us.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But there is not
institutionalized any internal mechanism such as, for
the city or the state has. We have the Legislative Ana
we have the annual budgetary process where there is competition
for resources and theoretically if you've got good management
good leadership, some reform and efficiency mechanisms mus
faced.
In the case of the judiciary, though, you s
the tab and if we don't like it, tell us to go to hell,
we've got to pay it anyway.
JUSTICE STANIFORTH:

No, we've never said

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: No, of course not.
I
you're telling me that there is indeed not institutiona
within judiciary some rrucial heartrending annual ..•
JUSTICE STANIFORTH: The question should
Judicial Council.
I am so busy grinding my nose on cases
rolling them out that I expect that the Judie 1
such a function.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

You suspect it?

JUSTICE STANIFORTH:
I'm on the front 1
trenches and I just don't have time to see what they
that level.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: What percentage of your
workload would you characterize as indigent criminal
JUSTICE STANIFORTH:

I would suspect about half.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: About half.
I vlOU
interested if you have any thoughts about, one of
I've got •.. and I've certainly want to assure you and
listening that I very much believe in affording full
opportunities and protection of the law to every citizen.
have some concern, though, that there is at least some
disincentive to pursue an appeal that has a very,
,
likelihood of success, that that doesn't really
st where
indigent dependent who has been convicted, but continues
full public resources at his disposal, to pursue an appea
if there are no merits for such an effort. And I think
problem that we somehow have got to try to address. And
me 50 percent of your total workload stems from that
certainly cannot represent 50 percent of the total
wouldn't think.
-9-

we

sent any
flurrv of ef
have a
for
of appeal.
on -- you're
st
ASSEMBLY~1AN

reporters.

are wa
transcr
be dead
now, avai
available
used in
here in our
process.
we haven'
their br f .
we get the
b
he

can't
safe.

would

I

of video
of the whole
level of
would exped
to
ze your
appreciate it. We
JUSTICE
expediting o
giving us the tools
that, we can do it
feeling, and a lot
you have to have more
I had all sorts of
CHAIRMAN HARRIS
to us, and we will keep the
recommendations that
an extension of your
my
would 1

the increased iustice
create more ju
ces
poor people; I've
so and so forth; is
we are going to be
appreciate your expe
that we
we need
to
Yes.

Mr.

does a
simply depend on the
individual justices?
JUSTICE
head.
ASSEMBLYMAN STI
JUSTICE STANIFORTH:
fellow legislators. Everyone
production.
I don't
differently. Thank
CHAIRMAN HARRI
from the Judicial Council,
I'd like Mr. Gampell to

to
different

Mr.

MR. RALPH GAMPELL:
or do ...
CHAIRHAN HARRIS
Staniforth our concerns
recommendations. We
special committee on
First Appellate Distr
HR. Gll.J;1PELL:
applicable to all the j
Let me just
question to Justice
centralized budgeting
budgeting for next
through the Judicial
and hauling and one
the Legislature on
appellate system of
that
MR. GAMPELL
budget
December
HR. GAMPELL:
certa
Analyst

Finance and their management experts have any input in
budget process.
MR. GAMPELL: Well, I know the budget people of our
staff are in constant
with the budget people
Department of Finance.
I don't know the extent to which
they do-- the amount ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: The reason I ask that as s
as a member of the Subcommittee on Ways and Means that has
budget, as you hold the Judicial Council's budget, constant
we
hear your representatives saying, "Well we can absorb this cost,
we can absorb that cost", if it happens to philosophically
with the Chief or you. But yet, there are other costs,
"no, no, there is no way we can absorb that", which tell
there is some fat in that budget and I'm not sure that
getting the proper scrutiny ...
MR. GAHPELL:
I think, Assemblyman Robinson, it is not
that it is fat, but it has to be heavy budgeting against
contingencies that nobody can predict. Such as budgeting
assigned judges; those judicial vacancies that are not
that we have to fund and nobody knows as the year goes
that fund is going to be. So it is appropriated and if
used, it's turned back.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Did the Governor's recent
executive order of two percent cutback affect your budget
MR. GAMPELL: \'le propose to go along with that,
think our situation is the same as the Legislature's. We
separate branch of government; we are going to go along
But the executive order to the executive branch obviously
affect the courts any more than it does the Legislature.
do propose to turn back two percent.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, if you turn back
percent and with the new iustices that were created in
Harris' hill, you are going to have some diffirulty if
all appointed.
MR. GAMPELL: We are going to have a great deal
difficulty.
If I could go back again to a question
Stirling's, and that is about the modern age. Yes, it's
brought on line, there is statewide data processingJ
the whole appellate system; that has been obtained and
bits of the program are being put in. And that was
through the administrative office. F.very justice of the
appellate system has a word processor and appropriate
have made an attempt in the last two years to bring the
system up, at least mechanically, into the 20th Century.
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We had a
and
and

State of
or another.
research and
provider, it may have
to simply develop
had been

HR. GAMPELL:
the mechanical technique
there are only two data ba
a much bigger data
the state, the
it in no way
would want.
you tied

MR. GAMPELL:
judie
access charges to them
which we could hE!ve
attorneys and
that we do.
in the
increments,
receptivity
didn't want to get
things, we didn't
lease terms, I
state public de
indeed, so ...

ASSEMBLYMAN
stage?

MR. GAMPELL:
the exper

MR. GAMPELL:

Well, we've only had it in for six

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That goes back to the original
question I asked you.
You answered by saying, "Well, there is
statewide budgeting now." But the excruciating, agonizing
reappraisal each year of all of our techniques, I hear you
saying, as I expected you to say, that you were doing a
good job, there, and we are always looking for better, and
fine.
But as the years pass, and if we are more concerned about
how a bunch of nice old judges are going to react to the reforms,
rather than the excruciating pain of the Legislature or the city
councils, or supervisors are going through, the exigency should
control and not the comfort of the judges.
MR. GAMPELL:
In the years when this state was fat,
Judicial Council of the past wasn't doing it, statewide data
processing, I've only got in within the last two years. When
things were timed, and automated legal research which has been
around for a bunch of years, I've got one in in the last six or
nine months.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, I congratulate you for
that, and, again, it brings up my point. Under the existing
system that you have, it really depends on the initiative of an
individual. Of the leadership of an individual, either the
Justice, yourself, or Justice Staniforth, or someone like that.
As opposed to an institutional relationship where there is an
annual reevaluation of that with some political -- judicial
political blessing -- the terms are now reform and improvement
technologically and don't give me all this nonsense about your
comfort zone and you only want to do two cases a year, ...
MR. GAMPELL:

There's another flip ...

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Does the Judicial Council have any
control or any role in all of this?
MR. GA}1PELL:

The Judicial Council?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

~1R. GAMPELL:
A role in what I've just been saying?
mustn't be forgotten that every appellate judge is an
independently elected public official, just as a member of
Legislature.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
Independently elected is
stretching the terms, Mr. Gampell, you are a very good lawyer
and know they are not elected, they are confirmed. They are
confirmed by the people, they are not elected.
MR. GAMPELL:
elected ...

I say the language -- shall so and so be
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ASSEMBLYMAN

excel
Governor.
an opponent
removed by the
still
think you are
tough to get
~1R.

GAMPELL

judicial sy
reform.
MR. GAMPELL
kind of thing you were
spread? This
f
presiding justices
of collegial
or three
appellate inst
run by the judie
if Judge X of a court
examp
One

we have
is, we _,_
,
sions of
requests
by the same
whereby there
process
conform, some
penali?ed.
MR. GAMPELL
concerned, budgeting
that
X
ls
committees and is
is something over
as far as

to operate in a certain
persuasion. There is no

, all it can

is

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON
example. Existing law, I bel
judge who sits on his
within an appropr
,
s sa
He certifies at the time
his sa
of carrot and stick approach can be expanded to
things as automation to be an encouragement to be a
less loquacious and more e
There are all
that could be expanded,
within the canst
limits.
MR. GAMPELL:
this state at any level
t.em is
the Chief Justice sitting at
of a pyramid,
below this, this level below that, and this level be
think, all I can give you is an example of why that wou
in California.
I think ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Let me give you an
Doesn't the Chief Justice have the ability or the
have the ability to stop
publication of
coming out of various DCA divisions and ...
MR. GAMPELL:

Through de-publication, yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. GAMPELL:
would like.

I th

Is that exerci
more than the

very
1 at

ASSEMBL Yr-1AN
But maybe that
peer pressure
use.
s
my experience
justices render a great deal more decisions, whether
upheld on appeal or not, that wou
have to be wa
begin to render more decis
s
a more effective
more reasonable time limits than other justices who have
50 pages of dialogue
simp
render a two
decision. Now if the Chief
to exercise
constitutional and statutory ability to not publish some
stuff, ...
MR. GA1'1PELL:

That has to be a court decis

ASSEMBLY~1AN ROBINSON:
If the court dec
that then, there would he less
for an
justice to think that he is rewriting the entire
statutes of this world at
he is rendering a
which would encourage him to be more efficient.

-17-

MR. GAMPELL:
lood in the streets

same
l\1R. GAMPELL
institutional capacitv
wondered why there was
maybe a couple of

sions.
productivity of the var
variety of other, I
,
occasional mixture -- not so
destroy continuity and a 1
perhaps annually or
MR. GAMPELL:
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT:
great dea o sense.
re is a
whether or not people
comfortab
with a very low productivity
the
accepted peer c
I must stress
thought, not inst
place and you pick
I don't like the
don't know how you would
to talk to you about
about Jones versus Cl
every couple of

you had
appellate
tolerated
sions
practice.
of rules
practice
is much worse that
fferent rules of
been allowed to
ss,
is

d

We do not have a monolithic, hierarchical court
in California and that means a group of judges are
on their business the way they believe to be the most
expeditious. It may not be the way their colleagues
hall think is most expedit
s
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me interrupt you. We want
along.
I want to ask this: We would like the Judie
to come up with some specific recommendations.
is some way we ought to be able to force that, because
think you are going to come back with some recommendat
s
to get a little better accountability whether it is a carrot
approach or a stick approach as it relates to the inconsi
among the so-called independently elected officials, e
come in with a new review process which I think is f
to have the Judicial Performance Commission periodical
all the justices and get some type of obiective standard
it is not used for anything other than to see whether or
are in fact performing reasonably well in terms of the
opinions.
If they are appellate justices, how many of
opinions have been reversed at the Supreme Court? To
really whether or not they are doing the job they have
selected to do.
Because, you know, where as we do not
appointment for life, it damn near comes down to
MR. GAMPELL: To show the enormitv of
task
state, we've been fooling around, now, for what, 15 or 2
on a much simpler process. Should we unify the superior
courts? Now that is a very simple up or down ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
might go ...

Don't mention that.

Mr.

MR. GAMPELL:
I mean, that's a simple question. And you
get any kind of consensus. And what you're asking, is
some way, without power, proceed to take over the
1
court.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: ~ve have some power, within
constitutional limits, to do
And what I'm suggest
this:
If our staff collectively comes up wi.th a list o
we would like the Judicial Council to answer in terms of
possibilities are, the problems that might exist with
rule making, for example, so that we have some kind of con
process of rules. What are the limits? What flexibil
we allow while still having something consistent. What
for example, in the report of the Chief Justice's
the First Appellate District, there were a number
recommendations. Maybe vve ought to have one judge who
the responsibility for passing on recommendations to
appellate court as to which appeals seem to be frivolous,
a pre-screening thing. Maybe we ought to look into those
things. We could come up with a list of those
of
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CHAIRMAN
will
caught up
your staff or
able to control
MR. GAMPELL:
you is that we will do
in from this
very edgy
time. But it
this
will take
operating
together
will
'VJill be with or
cal.
arguing that.
But
and I'm not going
judgeships as be
got economic 1
ing the so
putting
a
some parts of
working
well
want to
emulated
positive
branches
Chairman.
advantage
saving
that be

s

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why don't you get to the mike, so
the record reflects your answers.
MR. GAMPELL: Right after 13, there was a proposal
the judicial council brought up again for state funding.
of a tremendous ground swell on the judiciary, statewide,
was couched in terms of state funding with local control.
not sure I know what that means, but it was quite clear
didn't mean that it was to be centralized control. Now, there
nothing in the Constitution which would allow for centralized
control. The Chief Justice has said that she certainly doesn
look to it, doesn't want it. The idea -- the Judicial Counci
the administrative office has to be responsible for how they
a court, in the East Los Angeles muni -- it would entail a
bureaucracy.
It would entail some constitutional changes.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay. Well, let's take
elected judges out and just talk about the appellate system
how that's revamped to make it more economically sound,
it's uniform standards of practice like the federal circuit
have, or from that to changing the whole makeup of the j
council so it's given more authority and it can be held more
budgetary test by this Legislature who has, notwithstanding
recent decision of the state Supreme Court, the sole author
appropriate funds.
MR. GAMPELL:

You don't want me to comment on that,

you.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
editorializing.
HR. GAMPELL:

I'm not asking you to;

You're telling me ...

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
I'm just alerting you that
is some feeling in the Legislature that maybe that if the
is going to award some of these outrageous legal fees without
benefit of statutory authorization and what not, that it
come out of their own budget, so that at least they are tak
the money out of their own wallets when they give it away
regard to the state's fiscal problems.
MR. GAMPELL:

You still don't want me to comment,

you?
ASSEMBLYMAN U1BRECHT:
Right. What do you cons
unconstitutional, or what do vou consider would be edgy on a
constitutional ...
MR. GAMPELL:
I think any attempt to impose on appel
judges the way in which they are to carry out their elected
tasks, would be edgy ...
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ASSEHBLYMAN ROBINSON:
elected ..•
MR. GAMPELL:
could, Assemblyman, is
down from the committee,
and the Judicial Council
reflective thought and
with a hypothetical •.•

You insist on us
the best way I cou
If specif
hopeful that
answer.

ASSm1BLYMAN ROBINSON: We are not arguing
that a certain amount of power rests with this
through this committee, the Legislature, to modi
make more efficient, the appellate process with
are not constitutionally
from doing so.
one interpretation of your original statement and
keep -- I'm not trying to pressure you, Ralph, I l
believe it or not, you are fun to argue with.
MR. GAHPELL: You are making my original
have to be aware of our tripartite system of
judicial branch is the third branch. Now, I know
the power of the purse, but equally well, it is a
government. And each one
s to be solicitous of
the others. And that's not meant to be a cop-out.
branch is a separate branch of government.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
to add anything?

Thank you.

Mr. Davies,

MR. JOHN W. DAVIES:
In response to
regarding the balance between c
1 appeals and
in years 1979 and '80, figures show that there were
appeals and 4,586 criminal
s about 50-50.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
appeals in the indigent

And are 50 percent of

MR. DAVIES:
Yes,
and I believe that's correct.
years, about a seven percent
percent annual increase on
annual increase, and that,
t.o uhat' s been happening at
Circuit.
They've had a 6
enough, in '79-'80, the ump
side and only 7.2 percent on
growing at the same rate, and
ASSEMBLY~~N

ROBINSON:

?

was the response
s represents,
se on both s
the civil and
stingly enough,
1 level
increase.
was 16
criminal s
that case,
How much staff

Council have?
MR. GAMPELL:

I'm

to have to
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fer

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
one hundred •..
luded?

Just

MR. GAMPELL:
In terms o
In terms of analysts, we
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What's
centralized staff, how
MR. GAMPELL:

Five,

I'd say, six to
Gampell?
your

Just about s

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Sixty?

MR. GAMPELL: Yes. But that
stic1ans who do statistics for the
ASSE.HBLYMAN ROBINSON: Hell
I'm looking at.
If the Legislature
the Chief Justice a separate inst
or Judicial Analysts Office,
and tasks them specifically with annua
strative efficiency of the
slature on efficiency measures
adopted, is that something that would
r staff to do?
MR. GAMPELL:

numbers.

s budget people,
of the system ...
's the kind of people
an institution or
called the Judicial
ing to that effect,
ing the
reporting to the
been proposed and
sically feasible for

You're looking . .

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Say ye .

MR. GM1PELL:
If you're ta
something like that, that is ab
Analyst has only taken it on for
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
the source justice doesn't
ion reports and ship it up
MR. GAMPELL: No, it isn'
example; if you institute
Everybody asked why
ion to Assemblywoman Moorhe?
penalty? And the answer is
We believe that it will cause
1 be a need for more judges than
The money for those additional j
, that's a very simple cons
s implications. So, judie
not an easy thing to do. But
in any which way we can;
know me, know I run a tight
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about judicial impacts,
an horrendous problem
~month study, ...
problem
management
, I'm afraid. Take
let me give you the
Council was in
on the new drunk
opposed for a narrow
j
trials, there
s warranted in the
s wasn't in the bill.
but others, have
an easy thing to
answer is, we will
, and I think those of
at if we need more

help, we are going to
my statistics unit; I
court management unit
in their non-j
ial

get
Because I could double the size of
could treble the size of a thing called the
that goes into trial courts to assist them
side ...

ASSEHBLYMAN STIRLING:

Will that ultimately save us

money?
MR. GAMPELL: The answer is ves.
particularly in court management.

I think it would,

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
I think it needs to be done. The
thing that I am struggling with is that internally you are
running the good 'ole boys club, and eventually, the good 'ole
girls club probably, as opposed to having institutionally a Leg
Analyst role directly under the Chief Justice, who says, "By God,
you guys aren't producing," or, "You ladies aren't producing."
MR. GAMPELL:

And then what do you do?

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Then you take corrective action.
If you need legislative help to do that, then we will give it to
you.
MR. GAMPELL: That's the critical thing. ~ve
demonstrate, we put out the figures per year as to what the
various courts are doing.
It's the next stage.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: By and large, as I've heard your
testimony, and your staff's testimony, in Sacramento, has been we
have problems with our productivity and I say, "Why don't you can
some of the judges," and they say, "We don't do that sort of
thing." The whole argument against the judges retirement,
letting the old boys hang on for awhile was that if they were
over a certain age, they are obviously incompetent, and the other
side if they are over a
n age, they are better like wine,
as opposed to evaluating irrespect
of age or sex, based on
their product
ty. You simply don't want to do that. As an
institution,
don't want to do that. And that's bad. You let
everybody hang on,
's like moss under a rock. And unless you
let the sunshine
, it's just going to continue to be moss.
MR. GA11PELL:
I don't want to take the time of the
Committee.
ve raised a very interesting problem and one very
difficult to
to be fair.
Let me give you a for instance:
Do it in a tr 1 court. You publish the figures that Judge
Cramer has on
two jury trials in three years. What's the
guy doing? The answer is that he has been on law and motion.
He's not seen a jury case, but there is no way you can explain
that. Or, this judge, Judge Stirling, has not done any cases,
not at all. The reason being, he's the settlement guy, and he
only settles cases.
It's those kind of productivity figures
which can be so deceiving, or an appellate justice who's really
had some very tough cases ...
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That's really, as the Chairman, I
think is about to say, you can develop reflective data.
I mean,
we evaluate baseball teams and football teams on all sorts of
things that the public now understands and I still don't know
what an earned run average is. But the public understands and
evaluates professional athletes that way. We don't even evaluate
our cops, as something that is so important, and we sure as hell
don't evaluate our judges and you talk about the constitutional
limitations, let the public decide.
Simply publish those
evaluations in a fair manner, and I assume you have competent
staff that could get over those hurdles and reflect things in a
fair manner and let the profession decide.
Let the Bar
Association and let the public decide.
Let the sun shine in.
MR. GAMPELL:
I think it would be an interesting topic,
though I'm not sure it's one that's capable of any easy analysis,
how you determine what productivity is.
ASSEMBLYHAN STIRLING: The message that you ought to
take back to the Chief, and to the Council, is that at no time
has the judiciary been held in such low esteem by the people, and
believe me, that's reflected in the Legislature.
You look at the
number of constitutional amendments that were carried just this
year, to restructure the confirmation process, to restructure the
entire process for obvious political motivations, but at the same
time, the reason there was a political motivation for an
individual to carry a bill that drastically rewrites the way we
handle our appellate courts in the state, was because the public
was eating it, and loving it. Because they are very frustrated
with the system as we currently see it operate.
I mean, you just
can't constantly bury your head in the sand and say, "Well, you
know, we are indepenrlently elected and we will do what we damn
well please, irrespective of budget constraints, irrespective of
the people's will."
MR. GAMPELL:
I'd like to answer you in two halves.
As
far as substantive law, which is part of the big push, it would
be totally improper for me to discuss whether we are ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: No, no.
I'm pointing to that as
evidence, that you are in deep ~anure, if you will, in this
Legislature, which means you're in pretty deep with the people.
Look, because there are all kinds of formats whether we ~re going
to confirm them in different process, whether we are going to
have joint house confirmat
, or whether or maybe another
outrageous example, instead of having the people every twelve
years, why don't we bring the justices back to the Legislature
for reconfirmation everv twelve years before they go back on the
ballot.
MR. GAMPELL: That would even politicize the process
even more, wouldn't it?
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CHAI~~N HARRIS:
No joke. He's simply saying that
that's a possibil1ty, Mr. Gampell. He's saying, don't take it
lightly because people are talking.

MR. GAMPELL: Yes, I recognize that. But vour baseline
question is how could we increase productivity? We are
constantly inundated with proposals. One ex-justice was parading
the halls in the last days of this last Legislature. You don't
need 105, you can get out 200.
I think my answer is, you can get
out 300, if you don't want to read the briefs. It depends what
you regard as a basic element of procedural and substantive •..
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: That is true.
If you don't rP-ad
the briefs you can do 300, but you have to admit that there are
lUstices that only put out 20 to 30 opinions and they are not
very complicated cases. They are cases where either the justice
has fallen in love with the case, and he writes 50 pages as the
example I used earJier, or there are cases where the justice is
just flat lazy. Those people exist, too. You are no different,
that collection of people is no different than this Legislature.
Some of our colleaoues are less productive than others, or than
any other aspect of public or private service in this county.
But, you sit on your pedestal saying we have a perfect system and
don't tamper with it because the Constitution impairs you from
that.
MR. GAMPELL:
I didn't say that.
I said that the
hierarchical system does not exist in California which would
allow tampering froM above, to use your word.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Our next witness is the
Honorable Winslow Christian, Justice of the Court of Appeal for
the First District. Justice Christian, welcome.
JUSTICE WINSLOW CHRISTIAN: Thank you. I've been
observing and participating in the appellate scene and in the
legislative attention to appellate problems for a good many
years, now, and this hearing today is the first instance that I
recall of a body of legislators starting to look at the overall
institutional problems of our appellate system in any coherent
way. And I think that the state that we are in nov7, the very
difficult state that the appellate system is in at present,
reflects the fact that there has never been a comprehensive
reevaluation in recent years of what we are doing in these
courts.
I listened carefully to what Justice Staniforth had to
say and agreed wholeheartedly with everything he said on the
policy side of this with one exception having to do with the
court reporter problem and if there are questions about that
later on, I'll be happy to respond.
But I don't see that as one
of the central issues, and I'll just pass that by and base my
remarks, if I may, on the platform of what Justice Staniforth and
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Mr. Gampell have said and bring vou perhaps some additional
perspective and some very specific proposals as to things that
can be done with this caseload problem that we havA.
First, the difference in perspective. The American
legal system is, I suppose, the second cousin now of the legal
system of present day Britain and the relationships are still
close enough so that comparisons have some validity.
It's
striking to me that the United Kingdom, England, Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland, with the population of approximately twice
that of California, has at the present day, seven, that is seven,
not 70, Lord Justices of Appeal. Those seven judges, with the
participation of a good many trial judges on assignment in
handling the criminal side of the court's business, perform the
function of an intermediate appellate court, which in California
occupies the time of ten times as many judges. Seventy judges do
the same work here.
Of course, there are differences. Our societies are
different, the expectations of the people are different, our
people are more litigious, but I think it does bring a
perspective to this problem to see that over the years, the
willingness of the Legislature to add judicial positions has
given us, at the present day, by far the largest appellate
judiciary of any state in the United States. We just added 18
more, or are about to add 18 more under legislation just passed.
But I'd like to assure the members of the Committee that unless
really fundamental efforts are made to change the structure of
our system, and to effect the way cases come to us, that the
state will soon be asking for an appellate judiciary exceeding
100 in order to keep track of the intake of these cases. The
situation has sotten so bad that the backlog in some of the
Districts, and here I'll tell you what's happening in the First
District where I work, the intake of criminal appeals has
continued gradually each year to creep up. Those appeals are of
course by statute entitled to priority, and that's a priority
that I think is sound.
It should not be changed. But the ef
of this gradual increase has been to crowd the c
1 appeals off
of our calendar so that when the court got tosether some three
months ago to talk about this problem, and to realize the
emergency that we were in, we were virtually ceasing to hear any
civil appeals at all. A few priority civil cases were squeezed
on calendar from time to time, but basically we were hearing
criminal cases only, and a civil appeal when it was finally
briefed, would according to the trend then existing, simplv lie
there forever and never be heard.
Our backloq had already reached the state of in excess
of two years in some of the divisions.
I work now with the
emergency effort with the cooperation of the Chief Justice; eight
visiting ~udges have been signed in; each of our divisions is
split into two hearing panels. The judges are taking five
regular cases instead of four; our central staff ...
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CHAIRHAN HARRIS:
divisions?

Are the eight justices from other

JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: They are either trial judges or
retired judges of our court ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Just sitting temporarily?

JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Yes. So there are eight judges
visiting with the sixteen permanent, with the result that we are
able to have two hearing panels in each division and we are
hoping to dig ourselves out of this hole and be able to get back
on top of the civil side of our caseload. The Chief Justice is
also exercising delegated authority from the Supreme Court.
She
transferred cases to the Second District and to Justice
Staniforth's court and we appreciate that help very much. But I
must tell you that this urgent effort that we are making gives us
no real prospect of getting on top of this situation. It will
get us back in business, to some extent, but we have a situation
that drastically needs a maior institutional reform.
I want to get to specifics with some suggestions. The
suggestions that I have are, I think, rather clear cut. They may
sound simple. They are not easy. Everyone of them involves a
difficult political choice, but that's what the Legislature has
to do for us here, to make choi~es as to whether this state will
attempt to continue to deal with appellate workload by continuing
to increase the number of judges or \vhether some more fundamental
changes are possible.
Here, it's necessary, I think, to distinguish between
the civil and the criminal side of our caseload, because the
policy considerations that are involved are quite different. On
the civil side, and here there is nothing particularly new in one
form or another, these suggestions are already in the Feinberg
and Seligson report which the Committee has.
It seems to be
important, however, that in the criminal appeals •.. but first
let me back off just a moment to exclude, if I may, a number of
possible remedies that have been talked about for years that seem
to me unacceptable for good policy reasons. The New York
appellate courts and the Florida appellate courts are far more
productive than ours.
I visited in both states and looked at
their cases and looked at their work. The reason that they are
far more productive is that there is no constitutioncl
requirement that a case be decided by written opinion, giving
reasons. Of course, if we got rid of that constitutional
requirement, our courts could be made more productive.
I do not
propose that.
I would oppose that vigorously.
I think that our
state is not so poor that we need to remove this guarantee of
quality and protection of regularity and reviewability of
appellate decisions.
So I'm not proposing that that be done.
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time in the First District. And I can smell in a given case
where there is a big money judgment that the insurance company
doesn't want to
because they have the difference between our
statutory rate and
20 to 22 percent value of money at the
present time.
It simply should be changed.
CHAIID1AN HARRIS:

Mr. Cramer has a question.

ASSEMBLYMAN JIM CRA}1ER: Mr. Justice, I was just
wondering, aside from changing the interest penalties or changing
the interest associated with that, if there was a frivolous
appeal, would it be useful for the appellate court to identify
that and attach a penalty with that?
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Yes. As you know, there is a
statute presently, and also a rule of court, that authorizes the
court to impose a penalty which is taxable as costs, where the
appeal is taken "solelv for the purpose of delay." However, this
provision is very little used. We quit using it because the
Supreme Court would so frequently knock it out. Recently, when
some -- I'm not going to use names, but I'll tell you actually
what happened, and there were some new people who came on the
Supreme Court and in conversation, one of them said to me, "Why
don't you ever use this penalty provision. Are you aware of
that?" And so I sa
we gave it up because it wouldn't hold up,
so the new judge said, "You might try it again sometime. There
might be a new spirit." So ahout a month later, I saw such a
case and reported the conversation to my colleagues, and we
assessed a $1500 penalty, with an opinion giving reasons to why
we thought it was appropriate. There was a vote of three judges
on the Supreme Court to grant a hearing, obviously on that issue.
Since that time, in other of the cases, not in our division, a
hearing has been granted. Obviously on that issue. So there is
simply no reality to this as the court isn't going to exercise
its muscle over this kind of a thing when ...
ASSEMBLYMAN CRAMER: Excuse me, Mr. Justice, do you
think that budgetary realities may force a rethinking?
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN:

Possibly.

CHAIID1AN HARRIS:
In other words, we are, I think, of a
mind that perhaps economic realities would have the same effect
on you that it has had on us, that you find yourself constrained,
that you are go
make some critical decisions that otherwise
you wouldn't make.
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: The trouble is, I don't see the link
being made in the minds of the people who have that decision to
make.
CHAIRYillN HARRIS:
If they find that they can't get as
much paper as they used to get, they may complain about it and
they may quit
bench.
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JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Let me suggest something that is
also in the Seligson and Feinberg report.
It seems to have much
greater po~ential, and that is the idea of a modified scheme of
indemnity costs. Now here again the American and the British
traditions are totally at variance. The British tradition is
that the prevailing party receives indemnity for his costs,
including attorneys' fees at every level. The American tradition
is exactly to the contrary. The prevailing party does not
receive attorneys' fees as costs unless there is a special
provision in the statutes or in a contract that is being sued on.
Now what I'm proposing here is that there should be, by
statute, a provision, either directly making allowance for
indemnity costs on a modified basis, or perhaps authorization for
the Judicial Council to do this by rule. My own preference would
not be for the ...
I think the Seligson report speaks of $500 to
$1500 dollars going to the prevailing party.
I don't think that
approaches it correctly, in my own view I would propose that the
prevailing party on an appeal should recover as costs, to be
fixed along with his other costs on appeal, his real attorneys'
fees, which may be a good deal more than that, in every case,
unless the appellate court, in its opinion, wj.thholds operation
of this by certifying that the appeal is one that should have
been taken or should have been resisted on some probable cause
standard.
Now, if you had an institutional defendant who is now
taking an appeal
order to avoid paying a judgment, realizing
that unless a good case is made on this appeal, if it loses, it
is going to pay big attorneys fees, then you will motivate that
party to evaluate the appeal more carefully. This I think would
be a much bigger factor than the little one of penalties on
frivolous appeals.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN:
that

Mr. Robinson has a question.
Okay.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Justice, are you suggesting
cap on post-judgment interests? Or
sts?

JUSTICE
interest on

CHRISTIAN~

No.

I would say post-judgment

ASSEHDLYMAN ROBINSON: And would you lift the cap
totally in other words, perhaps tying it to the prime rate?
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: My own proposal would be that that
should be delegated to a Judicial Council rule with the direction
that the interest rate should reflect the value of money. So you
wouldn't have to qo the the Legislature every time the prime rate
changes. A rule could say that this year interest on the
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judgment is 20 percent because that's what the prime rate is.
Next year, it might be 18.
ASSEHBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well there would be some
reluctance, I think, to that concept of tota delegation.
I
think some parameters should be set out for the Judicial Council
to set that rule. The prime for example is a very debatable
thing. No one really calls money at the prime rate.
It's either
borrowed at prime, plus two, or they borrow at something below
prime.
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN:
I don't have a specific answer, but
I favor that kind of approach ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
In other words, total
flexibility.
Okay. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask a couple of pointed
questions if I might. One:
Is there a way, in your estimation,
that we can do what you suggest as it relates to written opinions
as they currently are performed in our court of appeals? But at
the same time, given a little more cursory review, a little
quicker review, perhaps with the process of, particularly in
larger counties, designating a judge to preclear, to look for
error, trying to cite whether or not he sees reversible errors
that might be considered on appeal, so that when they get to the
appellate court, they be viewed a little quicker, just from the
standpoint that you have some confidence in the trial courts ...
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN:
I was much interested, Mr. Harris,
when you mentioned this same idea a little earlier this morning.
It's one I'd not heard of before. My inclination is to doubt
that it's a good idea to insert another gate or another hurdle in
this process. My inclination is instead to motivate the guy who
is initiating the appeal way back at the beginning to think more
realistically and make a sound choice as to whether there should
be an appeal. When that happens, I say don't hold him back,
let's adjudicate the appeal quickly.
ASSE:£11.BLYMAN CRM1ER: Mr. Harris, were you thinking of
that being the trial judge or some ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I had a little problem with the trial
judge himself, rendering the opinion, that's what I was trying to
have, a separate party, a theoretically more independent party
who might in fact, by virtue of his experience, serve as a
quasi-appellate jurist within a superior court. Simply to review
for error with some direct criteria that he would look for and if
in fact deterMines -- it still would be able to go up to the
appellate court for review, but he would have a sort of
preclearing ability to determine whether or not those criteria
had been met or not.
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ASSEMBLYMAN CRAMER: The reason I asked that -- do you
think the motion for a new trial on those kind of procedures has
not been ~fect~ve at the trial level?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I vvould like to hear Mr. Christi.:m.

JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, I do have my doubts. The way
a criminal appeal starts in England is this way:
It is by the
convicted defendant applying to the trial judge for leave to
appeal, and that trial judge, if he allows the appeal, will make
a legal aid order. Having watched the operation, I am impressed
by it, but I have no thought that we have that much confidence in
our judges that this would be politically acceptable in this
country.
I simply don't propose that. There may be a way along
the lines that you suggested, but I don't know.
CHAIP~AN HARRIS:
Let me ask another question. And that
is this: There seems to be a "pass the buck" kind of attitude
relative to looking at the appellate process.
In other words, we
kind of look to the Judicial Council and say, "Well, why don't
you come up '"'i th some recommendations?" We know if there is not
a problem -- just with the process, there is certainly going to
be a fiscal problem that's going to call for some reformation or
correction. Then the courts look obviously at the Legislature,
and say,
11, some of these are legislative priorities." I'm
wondering if you have any recommendations. Should we create a
new entity to look at the appellate process? Shall we have a
task force within the Legislature? How can we in fact move from
talking about the problems and trying to really come up with
concrete solutions that are going to work?

JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, my experience in other areas
has been that the special study commission or special legislative
body's review of the problem, can work very effectively when
there is a general perception among the people involved, but you
are really under the gun in this particular problem. The example
is the Tort Claims Act. We were then under the gun, something
had to be done, and a Joint Commission was established.
It
worked very effectively and did very well. More recently there
was a joint legislative study in the area of tort law which was
not effective and not because there weren't able people involved;
but because there was not a perception on the part of everybody
involved, including the Legislature, that anything really had to
be done.
So no~hing happened. And I don't know if people are
serious yet about this situation.
I think our problem is
critical.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Robinson, are you serious?

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
of how serious I am.

1 think Mr. Gampell is well aware
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JUSTICE CHRISTIAN:
I want to say one more thing. One
more suggestion and this is the most difficult area of the law,
and that's in the criminal appeals area.
Hov1 do you motivate the
indigent appellate to think carefully and to take legal advice
before he decides to make an appeal that's going to cost him
nothing?
Because it costs him nothing at present and because the
trial court on pronouncing judgment must inform the a.ppellate of
his right to appeal, and of the fact that if he is indigent,
counsel will be provided for him without cost, there is a very
high rate of appeal. Why not, it doesn't cost him anything.
In
fact, the statistics are surprising, they show that there is a
rate of appeal of more than 100 percent compared with contested
dispositions and the reason for that impossibility is that there
are appeals after pleas of guilty as well, where there hasn't
been a contested disposition.
So, in effect, we are getting
appeals in more than 100 percent of the cases.
motions?

ASSEMBLYHAN ROBINSON:
Is that true in pre-trial
It is not just on final disposition?

JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, the only pre-trial motion that
comes to us, of course, is the 1538.5 on a writ and under
subsection m on the appeal.
I think it's anomalous, but I will
tell you it's not a big deal, it's not one of the big problems.
It's there, but it's not a huge one like these other things we
are talking about.
You have on your agenda, for later today, an appearance
by Professor r1oskovitz of Golden Gate University, and I'm not
going to anticipate what he has to say, but I want to say with
all the emphasis that I can, it is time for us to use ingenuity
in devising some financial incentive that will cause the indigent
defendant in the criminal case to go through the same kind of a
mental process that the non-indigent defendant does when he
decides to appeal or not.
Professor Moskovitz has a proposal
that came originally from Professor Maurice Rosenberg at
Columbia.
It's a proposal that has not been tried for creating a
modest financial incentive that will cause this defendant to
think before he decides ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Some assessment.
he may have to pay it back, i.e., a loan ...

In other words that

JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, there are different ways of
doing it.
Rosenberg started this off, and I la.ughE=>d the first
time I heard it.
His idea v1as that there should be, at the
prison, a little fund called the indigent defense and
rehabilitation fund.
So you credit to each prisoner, he
originally proposed $100, and then the prisoner, if he decides to
appeal, can appeal, but he has to chip in to the extent of his
$100, that doesn't meet the cost, the whole cost is much greater,
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he chips in to that extent, and so he thinks a bit before he
appeals, he might ask somebody, well, if I appeal, is there any
chance that I'll make it? And his counsel may advise him, no,
that the1
is no ctrguable issue here.
If he does not appeal,
then when he get out, he gets the $100 as walking around monev
for the ...
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT:
have to look into something ...

It's a good idea.

We're going to

JUSTICE CHRISTIAN:
Now you laugh when you first hear
that. We must find a way to bring some real thought into this
process instead of starting this paperwork treadmill in every
case.
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: On the way to the hearing this
morning my consultant was giving me a little briefing on that
proposal. M~. Hoskovitz is proposing a $500 -- on the surface of
it, it sounds very interesting and I think it does provide that
motivational thing that you are talking about.
Politically,
however, I have a little problem with voting for an effective
$500 grant to a convicted felon.
I'm not exactly sure how I
would go about explaining that to my constituency, that if you
are convicted of a felony, you are going to be given the benefit
of $500 from the people of the State of California, even though
ostensibly, it might save greater funds in the long term ...
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN:

Perhaps that's not quite the way ...

ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT:
That's what I'm suggesting.
I
think I understand what Mr. Moskovitz and yourself are
suggestinn,.
J'm just wondering, isn't there some other type of
incentive that can be provided or disincentive, if you will ...
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, I'll tell you one and I'll
tell you what is done in the United Kingdom, again, which I don't
recommend.
There is a provision that if you apply to the trial
judge for leave to appeal and he denies it, then you can apply to
the court of appeal for leave to appeal, and the panel of three
will look at the -- they have a different kind of record than
what we have -- they'll examine the thing, and they may grant
leave to appeal, and if they do, again, legal aid comes in and
lawyers are appointed and the wh0le process goes on.
If they
deny leave, they may add on the end of the term, the time during
which thi procedure's been pending, and that I understand is a
pov1erful incentive to not appeal, unless you have ... Again, I'm
not suggesting that, ...
ASSEMBLY~~AN IMBRECHT:
Let me just pursue one other line
that is somethinq similar to what Mr. Harris was suggesting
earlier about a ~ort of pre-appellate view process to see if
there is any clearer air, or anything of that nature. What if
vou were to designate -- say the PJ of a superior court with
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respect to all criminal appeals, to undertake such a preliminary
review and -- I don't know if it would be possible to preclude an
appeal or if such an individual indicated that it was unlikely to
be grounds for successful ~ppeal but, perhaps at that point,
trigger a reasonably substantial disincentive, maybe even
something akin to what the British system is but not having the
same -- not having the trial judge reviewing his own work -- but
another member of the court that would have principle
responsibilities ...
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, I think something like that
has potential.
There are some basic things we would want to look
at. We v.1ant to have immediacy and personal contact, so it should
not be a paper process.
It should involve people who know what
really happened in the trial court, like the prosecutor, like
defense counsel, like the trial judge or somebody in that same
court. This ought to happen before the whole mechanism of
working up a record has been set in motion.
There is an experiment going on in the Rhode Island
Supreme Court right. now, that. is a little bit of a variation from
this, that I'd like to mention to you, and that's a small state.
There is no intermediate court and so the Supreme Court, of
course, is the court of first and last appeal.
They are handling
first appeal cases like ours. And what they've done is thjs.
They have a very broad rule-making power. When the notice of
appeal is filed, one of the justices convenes a meeting within a
few days involving the defense coun8el and the prosecutor. The
purpose of this meeting is like a settlement conference but of
course, you can't settle a criminal appeal; but at this meeting,
the judge listens to the story as to what this case is about.
The defense counsel says, "Well, there was prosecutory misconduct
here; this instruction should have been given." So the judge
listens to what the other side has to say. He has the trial
court file.
He asks what really happened; he walks around the
case a little bit and then he decides whether he thinks this case
is a winner or not.
If he thinks it's a loser, he issues an
order to show cause, returnable before the whole court, why the
appeal should not be dismissed, or there should not be a summary
reversal.
If he thinks it's a winner, he issues an order to show
cause, returnable before the whole court, why there should not be
a summary affirmance.
Now the point of this is that there is personal and
immediate contact. Nobody's going to get lost in some paperwork
shuffle. And then there is no disposition, either a reversal or
an affirmance without the whole court having seen counsel and
heard arguments.
Now this is an experiment that's just started
that's been under way only about six weeks now, so it's a little
too early to say.
But, that's quite similar I think to what Mr.
Harris suggested and you did, too, Mr. Imbrecht, of a procedure
that gets in early to try to sort out potential winners from the
potential losers.
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ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT:
I'm curious, because you seem to
clearly demonstrate knowledge about some of the efforts that have
been undertaken and other courses that deal with some of these
problems.
Is this a reflection of your personal investigation,
or is there some source authority that we might turn to as well,
that reviews these kinds of •..
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, I took an interest in this
when I was Director of the National Center for State Courts, for
two years, and since that time, I have been lecturing on
appellate administration each summer in the seminars at New York
University and for that purpose I keep track of what's going on
around the country.
ASSEMBLYMAN CRAMER: Just so I can better understand
what you are saying to me. One recommendation is you v1ant to pay
defendants not to appeal, when you cut away, that's what you are
saying to me?
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN:

Yes, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN CRAMER: And then you're talking about a
pre-trial appellate procedure. Do you imagine that pre-trial
appellate procedure being done in the local jurisdiction on the
trial court level?
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: That's where I think it should be
done in order to preserve immediacy and real personal contact,
rather than have the paper process.
ASSEMBLYMAN CRAMEE: Okay.
So you don't want a record
prepared, but you would want to subject either the presiding
judge or some judge of that court essentially to the appellate
arguments, the case law reading that may very well be required,
so in effect, you are creating a new and different procedure or
administr~tive position at the trial court level?
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, I'm asking to reserve judgment
on this because I don't think what we want to do is set up a new
hurdle or a new process and so there may be another way entirely
of doing this such as, you know, representative of our court, a
judge or exper:Lenced staff member could take that function just
as well as another judge of a busy trial court. So we're just
beginning to think about this and I'm not ready to jump ...
ASSEMBLYrv1.AN CRAMER: Do you have some opinions about
those individuals who plead guilty and who appeal; how often that
would be a successful adventure into the appellate court?
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: Well, unfortunately, there is a very
high nunber of those cases and unfortunately, some of those cases
are meritorious.
The trial judges are having a terrible time
with the determinate sentence law.
It is full of traps for then;
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they make mistakes all the time.
I have thought that that's part
of the sentencing function that really ought to be given to an
escrm..r clerk rather than to a judge, it's become so complex. And
so after there has been a plea of guilty, judgment has been
pronounced and a lot of priors and consecutiveness as against
concurrency, and all these other factors are worked out, then
there is an appeal and then we go back over this thing -nit-picking it -- and we find error in a high proportion of those
cases.
ASSEHBLYMAN CRAMER: Some states have embarked upon a
procedure whereby they have two different appellate divisions
one, civil and one, criminal. You organized your talk along
those lines and I wonder if you are making that as a •..
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: No, I certainly don't. The people
who have thought about this are really -- I guess unanimously
opposed to it. The trend is the other way. There are several
reasons for it, one is that if you have a separate criminal
appellate court, this tends to become a low status court.
It's
hard to get resources for it and the judges get case-hardened.
You should hear Chief Judge Jack Onion of Texas who is the Chief
Judge of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Texas explaining what's
wrong with that system. Now Texas has just abolished it.
Louisiana has recently abolished it. There are only two states
left with it, Tennessee and Oklahoma.
I certainly would not urge
that we do anything like that.
ASSEMBLYf1AN CRAMER: So aside from putting pressures on
people, you are nor prepared then to recommend to this body or to
any other body to narrow the appellate rights of criminal
defendants?
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN: No, sir.
I'm not.
I see so much
payout a'•ailable in the other areas that I've mentioned that I'd
like to ~o those things first.
Mr. Chairman, you've been very hospitable.
other questions?

Are there

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Justice, I want to thank you. vve
have certainly been enlightened by your comments and have been
well educated.
I know we usually don't share confidential notes
fro~ nembers of the Committee.
But when you came up, Mr.
Imbrecht ha~ded me a note and said this is one of the real fast
justices in our appellate court system and I think that is
something that ought t.o be shared and we appreciate the
information you offered.
JUSTICE CHRISTIAN:
Imbrecht's district.

Thank you.
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I may move into Mr.

ASSEMBLY~~N

WILLIAM LEONARD:

He's not sure where that

district is.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. We are going to move this
hearing along very quickly now and I hope that you will excuse
me. The first three witnesses certainly have given us the
foundation and much of what may be said afterward I think will be
reflective of the comments of our first three witnesses.
It is
my intent to be out of this hearing within the next hour
no
more than an hour and 25 minutes, by 1:30 at the latest, we are
going to take a lunch break. So, I am going to ask your
indulgence and your speed if you have written comments, we would
like to have them.
If you do not, we will keep the record open
so that they might be submitted. We'd ask for summary comments
that will allow us to ask questions if we choose, but otherwise I
would appreciate your speed and not just rambling; we don't need
it.
Our next witness is Mr. Leonard Sacks, the Chair of the
Amicus Curiae Committee, California Trial Lawyers Association.
Mr. Sacks, welcome and we appreciate your comments.
MR. LEONARD SACKS: Thank you.
I will be giving these
comments on behalf of the California Trial Lawyers Association as
Qn appellate specialist, but primarily I represent injured
victims of torts on the plaintiff's side, and I was, of course,
tremendously gratified to hear Justice Christian make the point
that I felt -- I'm not aoing to belabor it -- the fact that there
is a very real possibility that institutional defendants with
large judgments against them are using the appellate courts as a
very profitable bank. And along that line, I would suggest that
perhaps this Committee would want to interrogate some of these
institutional defendants to get their point of view on it, such
as the large insurance companies, the insurer for the Pacific
Southwest Airlines which is involved in many an appeal over that
air crash.
theirs.

ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: We can predict your testimony and
The Committee's very knowledgeable on that subject.

MR. SACKS: Well, my point is this: Let's have them say
under oath that this is not a consideration when they appeal, if
they are willing to say that.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. SACKS:
I'm in court.

They're willing to say anything.

I hope I can quote you on that the next time

ASSEMBLYfvlAN ROBINSON: Well, all of you are.
I mean
both the trial lawvers as well as the institutional defendants
before this Committee are willing to say whatever they feel is
necessary to get the requisite number of votes and we're ...
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Sacks, do you have any specific
recorrunendations on the appellate process, how we can make it more
efficient?
MR. SACKS: Yes, well there's one thing I think nobody's
mentioned and that is the State of California itself is, in my
opinion, somebody that you might look at as a prime culprit. Now
you have, for example, the Attorney General of the state. It's
my impression that every time there is a tort judgment against
the state, and this may also be true of local entities too, but
perhaps more the state, there is automatically an appeal. They
are a kind of litigant that possibly does not have the
disincentives that private litigants do and they get involved in
a lot of things that possibly they should not get involved in.
The main thing that is my great gripe is that this Legislature a
few years ago passed a law indicating that it is the public
policy of this state that physicians have malpractice insurance.
Now physicians have malpractice insurance in certain companies
that have gone insolvent, Signal and Imperial I believe are two
of the companies. Then you have Signal and Imperial's business
being turned over to the California Insurance Guarantee
Association and the California Insurance Guarantee Association
taking steps to eliminate many of these claims which both
shortchange the physician and the injured plaintiff on the basis
of technical claim filings and these have resulted in vigorous
litigation and who do we find on the side of the CIGA but the
Attorney General and there are numerous cases like this.
I don't
think the Attorney General should even be bringing these cases
but this is one very serious area where you've got a lot of
appeals and possibly I would like to ask the justices whether
they see a lot of state appeals that aren't meritorious.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON Mr. Sacks, on that issue, as a
former member of the old Select Committee on Medical Malpractice,
did the state not by administrative fiat put those two companies
into conservatorship?
MR. SACKS:

I think so, yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: And that very act exposes the
state to liability for that conservatorship and that's the reason
for the Attorney General's involvement in those cases.
I mean I
think the record should reflect that there is a state taxpayer
who has something at stake in those cases by the Ministerial acts
of the Insurance Commissioner during the period of
conservatorship.
MR. SACKS: Well, I think this is true.
It may have a
taxpayer impact. The CIGA absorbed some of it but the point is
that the state is perhaps appealing in every single instance
where there's a taxpayer impact regardless of the prospects of
success and then every time the state does get into a case they
always ask that the o~inion he certified which also brings in a
lot of problems.
I'm just suggesting that as one area.
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ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: No, I understand that.
In the
Legislature and Mr. Imbrecht is Vice-Chairman of Ways and Means
Committee is well aware of it. Ways and Means, this year, for
the first time, has taken a policy position that any state agency
that involves itself in useless litigation before the appellate
courts and ends up having attorney fees awarded against it as a
result thereof have had those attorneys' fees taken out of their
standing budget so it's costing them staff attorneys' time and
that's about the only disincentive that the Legislature is
capable of applying against and it's not just the Attorney
General of the state, it's many other agencies that have involved
themselves currently in litigation, Consumer Affairs and what
have you. That disincentive is built in so they have the same
disincentive that a private law firm would have in pursuing a
non-meritorious case in the appellate courts. Am I correct?
MR. SACKS: Well, I don't know.
They've got attorneys
working for them and you know it's not like it's private
parties ...
ASSEMBLY~ffiN ROBINSON:
If it's a non-meritorious case
and the courts in their wisdom decide to impose attorney fees
against them as the unsuccessful litigant, it's coming out of
their budget believe me. That is a disincentive to pursue cases
that they have no business pursuing.

MR. SACKS: Well, I don't think that it applies to the
scope of cases that I'm talking about here. Certainly we cannot
get penalties for frivolous appeals and these cases are in the
numerous tort judgments against the state which they will ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
apt to get them.
MR. SACKS:

But if you pray for them you're

Excuse me.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
If you pray for penalties you're
apt to get them.
Statutorily, the courts are empowered to award
them and have done so.
ASSEMBLY~ffiN IMBRECHT:
We need to expedite this hearing.
While Mr. Harris is on the phone, I'm going to exercise my
prerogatives as Vice-Chairman of the Committee and thank you very
much for your testimony.

Next on our agenda is Mr. PauJ Cyril, Association of
Defense Counsel. He'll be here later I'm informed. Mr. Michael
Berger, past. Pn:.sident of the Academy of Appellate Lawyerf',
Vice-Chair of the Committee on Appellate Courts of the State Bar.
r1r. Berqer.
MR. MICHAEL BERGER: Thank you, sir.
I'm pleased to be
here on bchnlf of both of those organizations, boi:h of which have
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pretty much the same sort of feelings about the problems we're
facing.
I don't want to take a whole lot of your time.
I think
Justice Christian did an admirable job of explaining to you what
some
the problems are
re.
I hope
the shocking thing
that
did say took root here in the Corrmlittee and that is that
his court is virtually turned into a court of criminal appeals.
There is a serious problem with the mass
number of really
worthless criminal appeals that are choking the system and I
think something has got to be done about that problem trying to
find some way ro keep some of those appeals out of the system.
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT:
Has the State Bar Committee
worked on any recowmendations in that area?
MR. BERGER: The State Bar Committee is at the moment
working on a series of recommendations and some of the things
which we are considering deal with the kinds of incentives and
disincentives that Justice Christian talked about.
I think we
have to come to the point of considering monetary incentives.
I
think we have to consider the other thing that convicted
criminals are interesred in and that is time.
If we don't tack
time on to the end of the sentence perhaps you can consider not
taking an appeal to be good behavior and give them time off the
sentence.
I think it's time we have to consider plea bargaining
on appealing criminal cases. We've got to do something to choke
down the numbt?r, to make them understand that they have some
reason not to take the free automatic appeal that they have at
the moment.
ASSEMBLY~~N IMBRECHT:
Mr. Berger, when do you expect
those recommendations to be available?

MR. BERGER:
I believe we've been cleared to pass on our
report as a report of the committee itself though not of the
State Bar since the Board of Governors has not acted on it as
yet.
I will check on that.
If that's true, I'll be happy to
supply a copy.
ASSEMBLY~~N ROBINSON:
Are you looking at the
determinate sentencing law that was enacted by the Legislature in
'77 and I think '76?

MR. BERGER:
I don't think that that has been
specifically mentioned.
ASSEMBLYr.tf..AN ROBINSON:
We 1,
example, one of the
incen
s might be, and it's just an
that I just had, that
the determinate sentencing law has set a formula for good time
that all prisoners get unless there's a finding to the contrary,
you know, if they do something, if they're incorrigible or what
not and then the Adult Authority then can subtract from the good
time that they would get.
I think it's 10 percent or 20 percent
of the sentence.
That might be used as disincentives to
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frivolous appeals without making that a standard frivolous appeal
would be a standard for removing good time credit.
MR. BERGER:

It's certainly something to think about.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: And it would not be enhancement.
I think the civil libertarians in the Legislature as well as in
the public at large would probably revolt a little bit if we had
the English system of adding time just for exercising a
constitutional right.
MR. BERGER:
I would agree with you which is why I think
we've got to seriously consider giving them something rather than
adding a punishment at the end and as distasteful as that may be
in some mouths, the cost to the state and the citizens is just
too great.
problem.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Imbrecht hit on the political
You're not going to get away with giving a $500 bounty.

MR. BERGER:
It would be awfully hard to imagine how one
could explain that in their newsletter.
(UNKNOWN) Well, maybe we can do it in terms of time
then instead of money. That may be more palatable.
ASSEMBLYMAN H1BRECHT: Mr. Berger, might I ask you to
communicate to the members of your committee the intense interest
of this legislative Committee in pursuing this subject and ask
you to perhaps expedite your consideration? I would certainly
appreciate it if you could offer some recommendations to us by
December, but by the first of the year at the latest, since we're
going to have to pursue this legislatively at the beginning of
L'Tanuarv.
MR. BERGER: We are under a mandate from the State Bar
to come up with recommendations and a program that we've
presented the board is that we want to be able to do this on an
item by item basis. As soon as something comes up we want to be
able to present it to you.
Rather than trying to put together
some sort of massive package and running it through the Board of
Governors, we want to work on specific recommendations, the kind
you're interested in and we'd be very happy to work very closely
with your Committee.
ASSEMBLYMAN HmRECHT: Thank you very much.
anything further you'd care to offer?

Is there

MR. BERGER: There were a couple of other things on the
criminal side that I think bear some consideration. One is the
appeals after guilty pleas on things that didn't happen after the
plea. There are those appeals that deal with substantive issues
t:bat_ cccur_red hefo::-e +_he guLLty ple;_;_ aEcc_ "-'~n,~r'f' f:l!r:tf" cn'cf't-"l0n, T
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think, that at least ought to be discussed about whether those
appeals ought to be cut off. Second, there are the kinds of
criminal cases where the sentence imposed after trial in superior
court is in fact a misdemeanor sentence so you don't have a
felony conviction. Maybe the courts of appeal ought not to be
concerned with misdemeanor convictions. Maybe that ought to be
diverted some place else, perhaps the appellate depart~ent of the
superior court, but you, in effect, have the court of appeal
working on misdemeanor convictions and there are a fair number of
those.
One other thing, I was glad to see that there still is
some interest in eliminating the divisional set-ups that we have
particularly in Los Angeles and San Francisco. Both the Academy
and the State Bar Committee are still intensely interested in
that though we felt that, given the three new courts that were
established in the last session, the Legislature had lost some
interest in even pursuing it. The State Bar Committee did draft
a proposed bill during the past year though, it didn't get up to
you and I'd be pleased to send that along as well, if that's of
any interest to the Committee. We think that it may be a way to
even up the workload, what's going on in the courts of appeal as
well as to provide more substantive justice to those people who
are ...
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT:
I am still very much interested
in this topic.
I carried the legislation that passed the
Assembly and unfortunately it was heavily personally lobbied by a
number of appellate justices who have political ties to their
former colleagues in the State Senate.
I think that's the
fairest description I can possibly give as to why the bill was
not successful in the State Senate but things have changed and
the personalities on the Judiciary Committee have changed, not to
mention the 5th District which has changed and so I think that
there might be a better climate for those kinds of proposals.
MR. BERGER:
I can tell you then that both of ~"
organizations are still intensely interested in that and will be
h~ppy to work with you on that too.
One final item if I might.
I noticed that the letters
that '"ere sent out to us mentioned some concern about the impact
of the Judicial Council's circuit riding experiment. All I can
say is that with the creation of three new courts, I don't see
how there can be anv circuit riding experiment.
I think it's
been effectively killed but it will he interesting to see what
happens. You've eliminated the places where they could have sat.
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Well, they're going to have to do
something with the justices in the First District. They might as
well ride a circuit.
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MR. BERGER: That would be fine if there were a place
for them to go.
I'd like to have seen them go to San Jose but I
was overruled on that.
ASSEMBLYl~N

MR. BERGER:

IMBRECHT:

Thank you very much, Mr. Berger.

Thank you.

ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Before we continue, I just wanted
to notice the presence in our audience and invite her to come
forward, Assemblywoman Cathie Wright of Simi Valley has joined
us. Cathie, if you'd like to join us here on the dais, you're
certainly more than welcome. Next, I'd like to call Mr. Rudolfo
Aros. Mr. Aros is not able to be with us. Terry Smerling.
Is
there anyone else here from the American Civil Liberties Union
who wishes to testify? All right, fine, we'll move right along.
Mr. Vance Raye. Vance is the Senior Assistant Attorney General
for Leaislative Affairs. We see him frequently in Sacramento at
our Committee hearings.
MR. VANCE RAYE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think many
of the comments I would have ma.de have been made already, so I' 11
be relatively brief. The Attorney General, of course, has an
interest in appellate court efficiency since the Attorney General
appears through various deputies before the courts of appeal and
the Supreme Court of the state on a fairly regular basis. Just
last year, our office spent over 175,000 hours of personnel time
preparing respondents briefs in criminal cases alone.
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT:

175,000 hours?

MR. RAYE:
175,000 hours of attorney time on criminal
appeals.
I think one witness has already referred somewhat
critically to our role in civil appeals also on behalf of other
state agencies and that hour figure doesn't include the amount of
time that we spend on civil appeals. The number of criminal
appeals that our offices handle has increased dramatically over
the past ten years.
In 1970 we prepared approximately 2400
respondent's briefs.
In 1980 that fiqure rose to well over 4,000
briefs. The cost of handling these appeals is of course fairly
substantial. We estimate that it costs us well in eycess of
$~,000 per respondent's brief to file, to prepare respondent's
briefs and to appear before the court of a peal and Supreme Court
in these cases. When you consider that those cost figures are
duplicated by the State Public Defender's Office and are, as I
understand it, exceeded bv the cost that it takes, the costs of
the court of appeal in co~sidering these appeals, then I think
you get a pretty clear picture of the substantial amount of cost
money expended by the state on criminal appeals.
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Probably in the neighborhood of
$10,000 per appeal at a minimura.
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MR. RAYE: Probably so, somewhere in that neighborhood.
So it stands to reason that if we reduce the number of appeals,
then we also effect a substantial cost reduction which is, of
course, crit
1 in these times of austerity.
With this in mind,
our office
considering a number of proposals to reduce the
amount of time it takes us to respond to criminal appeals. We
think, first of all, that something ought to be done about the
right to appeal. Neither th~ California Supreme Court nor the
U.S. Supreme Court, as someone has already pointed out, has ever
articulated a constitutional right to appeal. We think the
substantial increase in the number of appeals over the past ten
years does not mean that the trial courts are committing more
errors.
It just means that people are appealing on more
insubstantial issues. We've ..•
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Do you have any figures, Vance?
Of the 4,000 briefs that were filed last year, how many of those
represented indigent criminal appeals?
MR. RAYE: Approximately, as I understand it, almost all
of those. About 93 percent, as I understand it, of the criminal
appeals filed are indigent appeals.
Somewhere in the
neighborhood of 90 percent in any event, so a substantial number
of those are indigent appeals. Therefore, you have the same
cos~s beinq incurred on the other side by the Public Defender's
office.
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT:
the success rate?

Do you have any statistics as to

MR. RAYE: As I understand it, the affirmance rate is
about 90 percent, about 11 percent of criminal appeals result in
reversals of the trial court decision so about 90 percent of all
appeals are affirmed by the court of appeal.
ASSEMBLYMAN IJI.1BRECHT:
So it would not be unreasonable
to suggest then that even assuming a 10 percent factor of
legitimate appeals that were nevertheless had the trial court
decision affirmed but that there was a legitimate issue to be
discussed so we're probably looking at 70 to 80 percent of the
criminal appeals being filed as being perhaps in the frivolous
category.
Is that too great a percentage?
MR

RAYE:

ASSEMBLY~~N

I think that's a fair estimate.
IMBRECHT:

Okay.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
How many of them were guilty
pleas that were then subsequently appealed because of sentencing
questions?
MR. RAYE:

We don't have figures.
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ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Would it be too hard to get

those?
MR. RAYE: There's a substantial number.
In fact our
office sponsored some legislation this year which would have
placed some restrictions on the right to appeal from guilty pleas
because of our perception that that number is fairly substantial.
(UNKNOWN):
MR. RAYE:

Is that a Doolittle bill?
No, that was Senator Boatwright's bill, SB

383.
ASSEMBLY~.AN ROBINSON:
If we've got drafting mistakes or
we have problems with the understanding by the trier fact of our
intent in SB 42 that's causing a substantial number of appeals
that were guilty pleas, just strictly because of a poor
interpretation of SB 42, then I think that we ought to address
that. The Legislature ought to address it and we're going to
need hard facts in order to do that because of the delicate
compromises that were involved in this original legislation.

MR. RAYE: Well, as I understand it, there are a
significant number of appeals from guilty pleas on sentencing
issues.
In many cases those issues are fairly clear cut and the
resolution of the issues is fairly clear cut. We're almost in
the position of stipulating to the outcome of the appeal where
the trial court clearly committed error.
ASSEHBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, if we knew that number then
we could take care of that part of the workload right there and
Justice Christian said earlier that there was a significant
number of those and your office since it will certainly have
access to 90 percent of the cases and if you could give us some
hard data ...
.MR. RAYE: Well, regrettably our statistics haven't
broken down the appeals by ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
I would suggest that you broaden
your statistical base so that we can have that information and
look at it.
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT:

Please continue.

MR. RAYE: As I mentioned, we think there should be some
limitation on the righ~ to appeal in consideration of the fact
that over 90 percent of crimi.naJ appeals result in affirmance and
a substantial number of that 90 percent r;ould be characterized as
frivolous appeals. lJe think there are two ways to restrict the
right to appeal. One way is the way that's set forth in a bill
that we sponsored, SB 1197 by Senator Doolittle, which would
invest in the trial court the responsibility for preliminarily
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reviewing all
ls. Appeal would be only by certificate of
appeal granted
a tr 1 court. The denial of a certificate of
appeal wou
be reviewable by writ of mandate to the court of
appea only. We thought that that would be at least one
approach. We
11 do think that's one approach to dealing with
the sub
se in the number of appeals. Another
proposal that we're considering is vesting discretion not with
the trial court but with the court of appeal to decide whether an
appeal, on
face, presents substantial issues that warrant
consideration
a panel by the court of appeal. In other words,
appeal would be
effect by a writ of certiorari to the court of
appeal and the court of appeal would have discretion to refuse to
entertain an
1.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Would you suggest that it be a more
cursory
or
vou think we ought to have a special panel
or a special judge who has that responsibility for granting the
review and certiorari, maybe not done by judges but by staff with
recommendations to the iudges or what?
MR. RAYE: Well, as we envisage it, the writ would be
filed,
forma but a brief or paper would be filed
with the court of appeal ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Nothing long?

MR. RAYE: Nothing long, simply specifying the
allegations o error containing brief citations of authority in
support of
se
ifications of error and then the court of
appeal based on that would decide whether or not the appeal
warranted
consideration. I think one thing that has to
be pointed out is
there are cost elements in this whole
system of c
1 appe~ls.
There's the cost incurred by the
Public Defender,
our office, and by the court of appeal.
Through this
we would cut down on the cost incurred by
our off
approximately one-third of the total cost of
handling a
appeal. In addition to that, we aJso ...
ASSEMBLY1~N

locally
or
think that once
be a record

ROBINSON:

I would argue in favor of someone
rather than having a DCA because I
the DCA, there's going to have to

ASSEr·1BLYMAN IMBRECHT: I thought Justice Christian's
some sense, if you designated a
that would undertake this review process. I
the actual trial court judge whose error
is being complained of reviewing his own conduct, but if you
provided some
ss whereby defendants and prosecutors and
perhaps trial judges could briefly argue these points hefore
another
court judge so that when it's fresh and
contemporaneous he can at that po
decide upon the issuance of
the certif
t vou discussed.
sugge
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MR. RAYE:
I think our original thought was to have the
trial court do it for the reasons that you outlined as an
alternative and it's an alternative that we're considering. We
haven't actually drafted the
slation yet.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Imbrecht is not suggesting
the trier of fact.
Didn't Doolittle's bill have the trier of
fact in it?
MR. RAYE: The trier of fact with review, right.
The
judge who presided at the trial would review. We had two other
proposals that we're also considering to expedite appeals. We
think this Committee should consider a procedure whereby our
office on behalf of the people can move for some reaffirmance of
appeals filed with the court of appeal. We attempted to do this
under existing law about three years ago and regrettably the
Supreme Court ruled the procedure was improper as not being
authorized and in fact being at odds with court rules and with
statute but a statutory and possibly constitutional change could
allow for a procedure whereby we could move for some reaffirmance
of appeals that obviously have no merit.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: The Supreme Court decision did in fact
mention constitutional grounds?
.HR. RAYE:
It mentioned constitutional grounds, right.
It sort of goes off on a number of different grounds, but I think
ultimately people ...
ASSEMBLY~~N

ROBINSON:

Do you have a citation on that?

MR. RAYE:
I don't have a citation.
People v Brigham and 25 Cal. 3rd, I believe.
the citation, 25 ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

The case name is
I guess I do have

I'm going to read that opinion.

MR. RAYE:
25 Cal. 3rd, 283, People v Brigham. And a
final suggestion we had was instituting a procedure whereby the
court of appeal, and this could possibly be done by court rule,
or just a change in internal operating procedures, whereby the
court of appeal after reviewing the appellant's opening brief,
defines the issues that it considers to be weighty enough to
warrant response by our office. By doing this, this would cut
down on the amount of time that we spend briefing issues that are
obviously not going to be a factor in the court's ultimate
decision on the appeal. Those are some of the suggestions, or
some of the recommendations that are the things that we're
considering, to deal with the problem of the appellate court's
congestion as it relates to criminal appeals. Obviously our
position on those recommendations or those suggestions are not
fixed in concrete just as our position on Senator Doolittle's
bill was not and we may or may not attempt to move that bill next
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year, but we
something has to be done or something should
be done to reduce the substantial amount of costs incurred by the
process of cr
1 appeals.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Raye, I'd like to ask you to
ask your colleagues in the office and the Attorney General what
his position would be on a scheme similar to the one that Mr.
Justice Christian described that would take some of the good
time, some penalty for good time, under SB 42, would apply where
the District Court of Appeals decided that the case or the appeal
was being pursued without merit and that that would be one of the
reasons, that it would be a disincentive to file these appeals.
MR. RAYE: Actually, we've talked about that. That
would be kind of a modification of the system used in England.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: What it does is it recognizes
that when we passed SB 42, we put in a scheme of good time.
Is
it 10 or 20 percent? I forget the time of the sentence and we
also put in penalties. You start doing a lot of manure
disturbing and you end up not getting that good time.
It just
seems to me that if you're also costing the taxpayers $10,000 in
frivolous appeals that that also would be grounds for not getting
all your good
An individual would then start thinking.
I
don't think it
1d be so severe that there is no way that
anyone would appeal because the criminal law is a growing body of
law and, notwithstanding what the Legislature does to make it
grow, it certa
grows in the courts too. But there would be
enough that there would be some recognition of the fact that just
because you're the
state's attorney you don't ...
MR. RAYE:

I think it warrants consideration.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Raye, does that conclude your

remarks?
HR. RAYE:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much.
I hope you'll
listen to some o
s that have been said and give us
further auidance from your office.
All r

Mr. Moskovitz.

MR. NYRON MOSKOVITZ:
How are you Mr. Harris? Hy na.me
is Myron ~1oskovi tz.
I'm a law professor at Golden Gate
University in San Francisco.
I'm also a Berkeley resident and
one of you constituents.
CHAIRMAN HA.RRIS:
MR. MOSKOVITZ:

Yes, sir.
I prepared this long ...
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I'm going to listen very attentively.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
my constituent yesterday.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

He won't browbeat you like he did

That's right.

MR. MOSKOVITZ:
I think I'll still be in your district.
I've prepared this proposal that's in the back of your materials
today that Mr. Justice Christian referred to and the way I carne
at this was to figure on what's the key component that restricts
people's use of various procedural devices whether it's appeals,
discovery, trials, whatever, and it's mainly money. A lawyer
says you have the right to appeal. Do you want to do it? Your
client says, "What's this going to cost me?" "It's going to cost
you $20,000."
"What's my chances of winning?" It's 20 percent,
30 percent, whatever and then the client decides and he balances
that money against the chance of winning and because that happens
in civil cases, the rate of appeal if fairly low.
It's about 14
percent. That was last year.
This year is was up to 17 percent.
As Mr. Justice Christian pointed out, in criminal cases it's 110
percent and to me that's the key difference.
Of the criminal
appellants, 91.4 percent of them are indigent according to the
State Public Defender's office.
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Of that remaining 9 percent,
what's the rate of appeal there? The non-indigent criminal ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

You mean the rate of affirmance.

ASSEMBLYI1AN IMBRECHT: No, the rate of appeal of the 9
percent non-indigent criminal defendants.
MR. MOSKOCVITZ: Of those that appeal, 91 percent are
indigent, 9 percent are not indigent, that's all I have.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: But what would be the rate of
affirmance amongst that 9 percent because that would give you a
bench mark to gauge the other by.
I think that's what you ••.
I was lucky to get
MR. MOSKOVITZ: That's a good point.
this.
I mean, I had to pull a lot of strings to get this
information because nobody is looking at this problem because the
Judicial Council has none of these ...
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: The non-indigent is still faced
with that same balancing question. How much is it going to cost
me and what are my chances of success.
MR. MOSKOVITZ:

That would be a good indicator.

right.
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You're

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Gampell, can you get that for
us, the rate of affirmance in the non-indigent criminal appeals
for a shot of time? Thnnk you.
MR. MOSKOVITZ:
I can just tell you right now it will be
tough for him to get this for the past. He may get it in the
future if he tells the clerks to send ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
I understand. He'd have to do a
shot in time like he's done before on other issues. You know
just take a picture of six weeks ...
MR. MOSKOVITZ: That's right. As was pointed out
earlier, the reversal rate, I don't have that for civil cases. I
couldn't find it anywhere.
In criminal cases, as was mentioned,
it's about 11 percent reversal. There is a modification rate,
too, that's about another 16 percent which, I think, as you
indicated, is a passing phase. That will be cleared up in a year
or two when trial judges learn the rules and maybe you clear up
some of the legislation, but the reversal rate is fairly small.
Another interesting statistic is the percentage of appellate
opinions that are published. About 25 percent of the civil cases
end up jn published opinions which means the judges think they're
pretty important. The figure for criminal cases is only 9
percent, very low.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Doesn't that vary district by
district? I've been given to understand that some districts will
have a tremendously higher publication rate and other districts
have a considerably lower one.
MR. MOSKOVITZ: That's true of everything I'm telling
you. All of these figures will vary by district, but the
over-all rate is much different between civil and criminal. I
got some cost figures for you too. You just heard some estimates
from the A.G.
The figures I got were for the representing the
indigent defendant. The State Public Defender's costs are about
$2800 a case, although they only handle about 37 percent of the
cases. The rest are private attorneys under appointment by the
court of appeals and the cost there is only about $750 because
they don't pay them very well. The A.G. 's costs are about $2100
and the ..•
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
appointment?

Why couldn't all of them be done by

M.R. MOSKOVITZ: Well, I' 11 leave that to you. You're
the ones that set up the State Public Defender and thought it was
a good idea.
I happen to also because they do such a good job.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But they're going- to be under
restrictions like everybody else, and if there's a more efficient
way of doing it, then it seems to me that, in other words, as far
as you know there's no bar to having- it done by outside counsel.
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MR. MOSKOVITZ
they don't get a cross
the toughest cases.
hardest ones. The
private Bar too
is between $6,000
appeals, the A G
There's a fourth
and that is the one
which is going to
higher than that.
to say is wasted
rate.
So, how do
system someway to
for himself whether
have
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT:
can do a
ar
appeals filed last

Just

MR. MOSKOVITZ:
Almost
same
good one, that you
I'll give you a very
yourselves decided
study in 1974 that
50¢ for a drug pre
reduces the use of
really don't need them
adopted this princ
and you estimated
year.

4285, something
cases.
The bas
and that
of that.
It's
-Cal.

with
that
MR. MOSKOVITZ

,

I

one.
ASSEMBLYMAN

Yes, I understand

point.
MR. MOSKOVITZ
defendants? The first
pay something from
prisoners do some work
could contribute a 1
think.
It's not
Everybody knows that
about it and do it
any necessities of
investigated that,
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me interrupt you one minute.
mentioned a figure of six to eight thousand dollars as be
cost to appeal. How did you calculate that?
MR. MOSKOVITZ:
I did it in a simplistic way.
the total appellate court budget and divided it by the
opinions and I cam out with a figure of I think $2,300,
my report, per published decision which is rough but that's
best I could do. For the State Public Defender, I simply cal
up their administrator and he told me it was $2,800, the A.G.
same thing, $2,100.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: The reason I was asking is that I
trying to make sure that the judge's time has been calculated
and so on and so forth and I think that certainly the way you
have done it is one way to do it.
MR. MOSKOVITZ:
I just took their total budget and
divided it by the number of opinions, that's all.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: But the production of the
the deputy district attorney time, you know a lot of time
are not here to pay you .••
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I think the number is low because
was coming up with the figure of 40 to 50 million dollars and
seemed to me that it was probably much more.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
Right, so just adding those
components is significRnt.
I mean, there's time for that
district attorney that tried the case to spend with the
attorney general that's going to handle the appeal .••
MR. MOSKOVITZ:

I didn't count that.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
I know but those are signif
costs that are still being paid by the same taxpayer.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Gampell.

MR. GAMPELL:
If _:rou' re thinking of 40 or 50 mill
the budget, 25 million of that is a pass through of the sta
payment to superior court judges, that component of superior
court judge's salaries and it has nothing at all to do with
Supreme Court.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
for the appellate courts?
MR. GAMPELL:

What is your total budget, Mr.

Between 20 and 25 million.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

That is strictly the .•.

-54-

MR. GAMPELL: Court of Appeal and Supreme Court but
that's for every aspect.
MR
Well, my
idea, as
make them pay a
out of
prison
turned out it just didn't work because only
prisoners have jobs.
are des
le
based a lot on seniority so you've got to be
you get a job and when the convicted defendant has to
whether to appeal, he's not going to have a job yet.
take him a year or so to get a job so that doesn't
I thought of this idea of, as you put it, giving them some money
and then, I didn't say $500, I said $200, and he
money ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Fifty cents will
a lot of political trouble. Can you see our col
give Sirhan Sirhan $50 or much less $200? I mean
real perception problem.
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS:
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

A psychological,
Or the Eastside

st

MR. MOSKOVITZ: I know.
I have some ways of
that I think. First of all, if you ...
ASSEMBLY~~N

ROBINSON:

We wouldn't need

if that would pass.
MR. MOSKOVITZ: There's about 11,000 prisoners
corning in.
I propose giving each of them $200 which
forfeit if they want to appeal.
I figured out that if this
influences 10 percent of them not to appeal, whi
figure, the state's going to save 1.3 million
lars
you influence 50 percent of them, you save over 12
dollars a year, so one response to your constituents i
have this tremendous savings ultimately to them
's
times this $200. At $500 it wouldn't work out as well.
not only for the political reason you mentioned but
give $500 to a lot of people who wouldn't appeal anyway
break even point becomes -- you'd have to inf
them. The only reason I put $500 in My proposal was
my proposal out to a lot of judges and lawyers for
it was mostly very favorable. Everybody thought it was
idea to try it out, not to impose it statewide
jus
out, which is all I am recommending to you as a
One of the comments that I got from a couple
was $200 isn't enough to
luence these guys. You're
have to go a little higher than that these days and I'm
I agree with that.
I th
any amount that makes the man
down with his lawyer and talk about it and think
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enough to
of meritless appeals even if
$100. So what
the test project is to
0 new
inmates picked
, divide them into five groups and you
give one
400
, 3, 2 and 1 and then
do this
a
aga
a
nothing and
See if the rates
of
appeals
any of the groups, if
rate
is dif
groups and try it out. Now, you
could add on
some test some time off instead of money if
you wanted. My initial reaction th<'l.t giving time
f
doing
this is a bad idea.
I ...
ASSEMBLY~~N ROBINSON:
My proposition is they already
get time
policy established
SB 42
order to
isoners
control in
prisons
they will get time off, I believe it's 20 percent, the staff can
correct me, of the time sentence they get off. Okay, what I was
suggesting is that the time that they would otherwise be entitled
to, the filing of a frivolous appeal would be the same as setting
your mattress on f
and therefore you would lose so many months
of good time. That I believe is considerably more palatable
because going
of money, I'm
, I mean
you're a
're a professional in
s f
, I
assure you if polled
1 practitioner or the lawyer in
Orange County who handles a percentage of criminal cases but is
not a criminal appel
specialist and asked them what they
think of $50 bounty to all the prisoners and I've got a good mix
of Republicans and Democrats, mostly Republican in my county,
they will tell me I'm
and then as I jokingly said to Mr.
Imbrecht, but is absolutely true given the competitive nature of
the jobs that all of us hold both in the Senate and the Assembly,
that no matter how well intended we'd only be able to convince a
few CPA's and a few criminal appellate attorneys that what we
were doing made economic sense, that we were in
saving the
taxpayers
else would believe that we were
getting
would be those
that were stupid
the bill
to vote for
plan.

11, I'll tell you I, a
this out

,

..

ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT:
in campaign

Mr. Robinson

'm sure he's more

I sent

I
as an

am on

that
ASSEMBLY.M_AN IMBRECHT: He knows exactly as I do
I
can perceive how that thing would be phrased and we're not just
pursuing
-- one
concern as I sit here and
about
the $100, I mean I m
to put my own mental state
the
shoes of
a state prison. What
s
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money do you while you're
commissary privileges, I unders
sort of thing but not much
mental attitude would
gambling $500 versus
long shot. The
commissary or
versus even an outside
MR. MOSKOVITZ:
people in the system
that's not right.
It might be right at a very low
fact these commissary privileges are very important
prisoners. They don't
to take
soap
by the syste~, or the c
s. They can
stuff, small radios,
and if
long it's going to
earn the 20
takes to get a small transistor radio at
hour, that's hundreds of hours.
$200, I
into almost a year of work at five
could influence a lot
take your year's worth of
you instead of this worthless
proposing we go ahead and
s
bucks isn't enough, we
to go
view that 200 is enough. Let's
an experiment,
of different figures and see what we get. The t
here's what bothered me and that is you compared it to
setting his mattress on
re.
If he sets his mattre s
he's shown that he's not rehabilitated and shouldn t
good time off and shouldn't go out on
streets
things related to good
things that re
rehabilitation whereas
your appeal
with that. You really are, in
, making
time because ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You have to
the time the Legislature
our
the Penal Code we made a
interested in rehabil
systems are exactly that,
,
will have fixed and
and
statement made at the time SB 42 was adopted
suggesting would be consistent with that pol
MR. NOSKOVITZ:
word but the factors that
whether the person
is different. Now I don t
feel. ..
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON
harebrained idea, if there are
it.

No, this is an
lems with
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I want

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
It certainly
mind, worth exploring. My thing about good
suggesting that as anv kind of automatic. That
a decision of the court ...
MR. MOSKOVITZ: As
nothing wrong with putting
time.

as

CHAIID'T..AN HARRIS: Mr. Moskovitz, I think we
certainly the spirit of your ideas on the question of
disincentives and incentives we do want to explore
closely and we appreciate your on-going cooperation
with our staff relative to finding out what, in
and also for our own 1
s what is going to
salable. We can educate our communities but also
all of the ramifications of any of the proposals we
consider.
Is there anything you'd like to add to your
MR. MOSKOVITZ: No, I think I've pretty well
One thing I would add is that I thought it was rather
that it took in a way someone like me on the outs
of
government, I'm the head of the State Housing Commiss
another field, but in the criminal area I'm outs
of
government, and nobody in government was looking toward
of thing and I had to, as I said, pull some strings to
of this information. No one was trying to look at the
picture. Each segment of government was looking at
problems.
I did get a negative reaction from the
Corrections that said pretty much if we go along
we're going to qet attacked by a lot of prison groups
sure that's true but who is looking at the big picture
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

We are.

That's why we're

hearing.
!-1R. MOSKOVITZ:

's why I'm here.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I appreciate that
also
understand that to a certain extent it has been a
kind of a situation where we've looked at Correction ,
looked at the judiciary, we've looked to everybody and
are you doing, what's the Governor proposinq, et cetera
quite frankly, nothing was forthcoming but perhaps
because of economic realities. Maybe that's one of
realities of Proposition 13.
It is forcing us to
we do business and decide what our priorities are
whether or not there's a better way to do business.
Mr. Moskovitz.
MR. MOSKOVITZ:

All right.
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If you need me,

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We will. \·Je' 11 be in touch and the
staff certainly will be ta
to you.
Our next witness is Mr. Henry Mann who is with the
1
Research D
the San Diego
ice and who is
the California Distr
Association.

s

MR. HENRY rffiNN: Thank you, Assemblyman. My name is
Henry Mann.
I'm with the San Diego County District Attorney's
Office.
I'll make very brief remarks. District attorneys
historicalJy have not been involved in the appellate process. We
generally get involved with the pre-trial writs and when the
people appeal. The three areas that we see in our limited
experience, however, the major area that we see that could
corrected is to push the appellate rights of the defendant.
I have three examples I think which will lay this out.
Under Section 1538.5 of the Penal Code, subdivision I, the
defendant has a right a
brings his motion into the
superior court to take a writ to the court of appeal and then
subsequently to the Supreme Court. After a plea of guilty or a
finding of guilt by the court or jury trial, he can also appeal
this if there's been no definitive decision by the court of
appeal before. We think that this particular area here could be
eliminated, that is the pre-trial writ.
I notice Justice
Christian said that it didn't bother him very much. However,
Justice Staniforth in discussing his writ procedures said three
justices have to review t.hat. Now the defendant
les a
petition. We are normal
required to file a response which is
loaded with facts and laws that somebody has to review. And we
generally have two of those at any one time in our office each
week. Now if you can multiply that by the amount in the Los
Angeles I would believe that is somewhat significant and wou
holding down the justices in looking at the appeals.
Another area is dealing with matters be
the
preliminary hearing in felonies. We've had a lot of situations
in which t.he defense attorneys <1re unhappy with, for example, a
discovery motion prior to preliminary examination. They then
take an extraordinary writ to the superior court and then
from superior court if they're not satisfied to the court of
appeal and then subsequently to the SupreMe Court. We think
that is an abuse because all of those errors can be tested later
on appeal from conviction. They don't need to be contested
obviously if the defendant is acquitted. And we think that one
of the more gross abuses deals with misdemeanor cases and
touched on a little bit by a previous witness.
In a mi
case, if a defendant is not happy with some action of the court,
whether
be justice court or municipal court, they take a wr
again to the superior court and again if they lose there they
have the right to take the
on to the court of appeal.
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ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: But it's much, much lower than
what the current price of money is for commercial markets and
that's ...
MR. CYRIL:

The point I was trying to address is ...

ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT:
I'm not thinking of interest as a
penalty to be imposed and it's hard for me to see it being fair
characterized under those circumstances, in that context.
MR. CYRIL: The point I was trying to address is should
interest rates be increased to create disincentives for appeals
that shouldn't be filed, I say to you that maybe the interest
rates ought to be increased because of the economic climate, for
historical reasons, for •..
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: The question is, the real
question is, do the low current interest rates create an
incentive for appeal? I'm not suggesting we raise interest rates
to create a disincentive necessarily, but to eliminate what may
be the circumstance today which there maybe is in effect an
actual incentive. The cost of money is 21 or 22 percent and
we're only charging 10 percent interest on judgments. That's a
pretty substantial contrast.
MR. CYRIL: As a practitioner I can tell you truthfully
I don't see that as a factor coming up in my cases and that's all
I can tell you.
ASSEMBLYMAN IMBRECHT: Judge Christian testified to us
earlier that he sits in settlements of appeals where he is
convinced that's the factor, where there's a substantial judgment
that's been rendered of a million dollars or more against an
institutional client.
MR. CYRIL:
I guess
just depends on how you see this
but I certainly don't. My members of my organization ...
CHAI~~N HARRIS:
I certainly appreciate the offer of
assistance and advice from your organization.
I hope you have a
sense that we are serious about doing something about our
appellate process in California if for no other reason than ...

MR. CYRIL:

Right.

CHAI~~N HARRIS:
And we would like to have your
participation so that we're not doing something that's haphazard,
something that's not going to be workable.
If there are other
specific recommendations that you would care to offer after
deliberations with your colleagues and your association, we would
be more than happy to receive them and we certainly would
appreciate your on-going advice and cooperation as that proceeds.
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MR. CYRIL:

Thank

We're glad to

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
If there are no
hearing will be adjourned and we thank all
your participation and
continued efforts on

# # # # # #
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

All Members of the Assembly Judiciary and
Criminal Justice Committees

FROM:

Geoff Goodman, Rubin Lopez, and Ray LeBov

SUBJECT:

Interim Hearing on Appellate Court Efficiency

DATE:

October 6, 1981

On October 15, 1981, the Assembly Judiciary and
Justice Committees will hold a joint hearing in San Diego on Court
of Appeal efficiency. The hearing is scheduled to begin at 10:0
in Room 310 of the County Administration Building, 1600 Pacif
Highway, San Diego, California.
Members of the staffs of both Committees have sol
testimony from Justices of the Appellate Court, appellate
and other experts. The witnesses were requested to present
which identifies problems, if any, in appellate court structure
administration and practices as well as proposals for improving
appellate court efficiency.
In particular, witnesses were
focus on addressing the following issues:
1.

Identification
the nature, extent, and cause
of problems, if any, relating to volume and
in California Courts of Appeal. For example:
What is
impact of criminal appeals on
civil appel
calendaring?
How does the current appeal court structure
including the existence of multiple divis
within districts, affect judicial efficiency?
Do available statistics indicate the existence
of substantial problems in delay or
in the
1
courts?
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2.

Identification and evaluation of
used
What is the
of the
pre-hearing settlement conferences
First and Third Appellate Districts
What results can be anticipated from the
Judicial Council's circuit riding

3.

Further
efficiency.

for improving
For example:

Would limiting or restricting appealable
be a reasonable approach to curing volume
delay problems?
How does the use of legal research
affect appellate caseload? Does the
central staff attorneys result in
productivity?
INCREASED WORKLOAD
Over the past two decades, ap?ellate courts
the country have experienced a dramatic increase
reasons have been given for the expansion of appellate
exploding population, increased urbanization, the
the rights of prisoners, criminal defendants and consumers
tendency of many segments of society to rely on the courts
social problems.
California's Courts of Appeal, like
elsewhere in the United States, have experienced pers
in caseloads.
The following tables illustrate this
comparing workload, disposition by written opinion, and
at five-year intervals from 1964-1965 through 1979-1980.*

*"Report of the Chief Justice's Special
Appellate Practices and Procedures in the First
April 21, 1981, p. 9.
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CIVIL AND CRIMINAL APPEALS FILED
First
Dist.

r

Third

Fourth
Dist.

-·---

Fifth
Dist.

---

1964-65

659

1,304

240

401

118

1969-70

1,:'.36

2,089

370

725

223

4,543

1974-75

1,571

2,374

596

1,000

374

5,915

1979-80

2,276

3,153

931

1,641

833

8,835

Average Annual Increase, 1969-70 to 1979-80 (Approximate
7%

3 1/2%

10%

8 1/2%

14 1/2%

DISPOSITIONS OF APPEALS fu~D ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS
BY \\TRITTEN OPINIO:-;', TOTAL AN'D PER JUDGE*
First
Dist.
Per
Total Judge

69-70

446

51.8

890

769

64.1

1,590

99.2*

1, 712 100.0*

1,527
1979-80

Second
Dist.
Per
Total Judge

Third
Dist.
--Per
Total Judge

Fourth
Dist.
Per
Total Judge

Fifth
Dist.
Per
Total Judge

140

46.7

216

72.0

123

41.0

232

58.0

437

48.6

175

58.0

2,347 103.8*

516

81.9*

851

97.8*

330

86.8* 5,5

2,377 105.2*

664

83.0* 1, 350 124.4*

556

74.2
79 5

109.0* 6,

Also see the qraphs attached as Exhibits 1-5. These
graphs are in "semi-log" s~ale so that equal vertical distances
represent equal percentages of change, and a constant percent of
change produces a "straight line" slope, regardless of the size
of the number.
PROPOSED CHANGES
The traditional answer to increasing appellate caseloads
has been to increase the number of appellate judges. This
has not always been possible and according to some writers, not
sfactory.
(See Goldman,
, "The Appellate Settlement
ence an Effective Procedural Reform," State Court Journal, Vol .
. 1, Winter 1978, pp. 3-5).

*Per authorized judge for 1964-1965 and 1969-1970;
udge-equivalent (not available for 1964-1965 or 1969-1970) for
974-1975 and 1979-1980 to take into account assigned j
extended absence and vacancies in office.
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Recently the Special Committee on Appellate Practices and
Procedures in the First Appellate District submitted its final
report.
(A copy of the Summary of the Report is attached as
Exhibit 6). The Report contained six specific findings:

•

1.

Appellate caseload is growing steadily.

2.

Such techniques as the use of central staff for
dealing with increased appellate caseload without
a corresponding increase in judgships have facilitated the work of the courts, but have created some
appearance of diminished judicial control over the
appellate decision-making process, and have reached
the limit of their effectiveness .

3.

Appellate caseloads per judge are already excessive.

4.

It does not now appear to be necessary or practical
to make any material change in the law providing
for the right to appeal.

5.

Some measures to discourage appeals taken solely
for the purpose of delay would be appropriate.

6.

Some measures can be taken to speed appeals without
sacrificing the quality of the decisionmaking process.

The Special Committee also made 18 separate recommendations
regarding methods of handling increased appellate caseloads. Those
recommendations are included in Exhibit 6 to provide an overview of
the broad range of proposals in this area.
What follows is background material on some specific
issues
expanded use of pre-hearing settlement conferences, the
use of professional and centralized staff, and restrictions on
criminal appeals.
PREHEARING SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
The Prehearing Settlement Conference (PHSC) is a relatively
recent innovation designed to reduce appellate court judges' workload
and to expand their available time by encouraging settlement. Although
the specific operation of PHSC's differ from court to court, there
are several elements common to the innovative procedure. Opposing
counsel meets with a judge or, in a few courts, with a staff attorney
who through various procedures seeks to encourage or arrange settlement of the case. The proceeding is confidential. If settlement is
not reached, the judges hearing the appeal have no knowledge of what
was said in conference. The conference mediator (i.e., the judge or
staff attorney) is not involved in the later substantive consideration
of the appeal. Approximately 12 state appellate courts have implemented some form of PHSC procedure.
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The major benefits from a PHSC program are that it may
lessen the number of appeals that require consideration by our
appellate court and permit a narrowing of issues prior to hearing.
However, there are some potential drawbacks that must be recognized.
Critics suggest that the time spent by mediators could be better
spent hearing and deciding cases under normal processes. Some
critics suggest that preparation for settlement conferences delays
the normal process (e.g., the preparation of transcripts may be
delayed pending a settlement conference). Further, critics suggest
that the time and expense required by PHSC programs simply do not
justify the effort of implementation.
In California, the First, Second and Third Appellate Court
Districts have settlement conference programs.
Rule 19.5, California
Rules of Court, permits presiding appellate justices to order appellants to file a short statement of the nature of the case and the
issues on appeal after the notice of appeal had been filed and to
order all counsel to attend a prehearing settlement conference.
Each district is permitted, by local rule, to establish their own
program to meet local needs. For example, in the First Appellate
District, counsel are ordered to appear at a PHSC in all cases that
are subject to the program (the program excludes juvenile and
in pro per cases). However, parties are allowed to "opt out" of the
program if they think settlement would not be useful. The PHSC
program in the Second District is completely voluntary and parties
must agree to participate in the program before the case is arraigned
to a settlement judge and a conference date set. The Third Appellate
District's program is mandatory.
If any party accepts an invitation
to participate, regardless of the desire of other parties, the case
is submitted to the conference program.
If no party accepts a
settlement, the judge decides after briefly reviewing statements
proposed by the parties, whether to order a conference.
Statistical data on the success of the California program
is incomplete. Nevertheless, the Third District strongly advocates
PHSC's expanded use and has published the following data:**

**See Janes, Betram, George E. Paras, Anita Rue Shapiro,
"The Appellate Settlement Conference Program in Sacramento,"
California State Bar Journal, (Vol. 56, No. 3, March 1981, p. 112).
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Conferences and Settlements in Qvil Appeals
at the California Court of Appeal, Sacramento
Year
3month
trial period
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979···
1980

Civil Appeals

Settlement Conferences

156
316
387
439
439

Cases Settiect

66(42%)•.
134(42%)
92 (24%)
194(44%)
295 (67%)

530

·~rcentage of civil appeals in which settlement conferences
• ·~rcentage of settlement conference cases that settled.

36(55%)...
72(54%)
54(59%)
105(54%)
147(50%)
134 (49%);. ...

363 (68%)
were held

• • "No statistics are available for 1979.
• • • "The number of settlement conference cases that have settled thus far, and the percentage of all non pending settlement
conference cases that have settled.
-

Gvil Appeals Dismissed."
California Court of Appeal

Fiscal Year
1972-1973
1973-1974
1974-1975
1975-1976
1976-1977
1977-1978
1978-1979
1979·····
1980 .......

Statewide••
Civil Appeals
Dismissed
430 (21%)•••
2014
400(19%)
2116
489 (21%)
2380
668 (24%).
2837
825(29%)
2883
785(26%)
3064
3219
8?7 (27%)

Sacramento
. Civil Appeals
DismiSsed .
32(12%)........
263
264
43(16%)
306
88 (29%)
346
121 (35%)
400
138(35%)
454
211 (46%)
443
176 (40%)
515
210 (41%)
530.
247 (47%)

• After the record was perfected.
""Except Sacramento.
"""Ptrcentagt- of statewide (except Sacramento) civil appeals dismissed. after the record was perfected
• • • • ~rcentage of Sacramento civil appeals dismissed. after the record was perfected
•,. • • •No statewide statistics are available at this time.

CENTRALIZED AND PROFESSIONAL STAFF
Another controversial aspect of appellate court procedure
is the role and function of the courts' staff attorneys (i.e.,
attorneys assigned to particular individual justices, writ attorneys
and central staff attorneys). There is a sharp division of opinion
as to precisely what functions the courts' staff should perform.
It is generally agreed that legal staff can help increase a court's
productivity. However, some commentators have observed that such a
staff, particularly a central court staff (i.e., staff serving the
court as a whole) may fulfill what is more properly a judicial
function and have undue influence in the deciding of cases. This
function is believed to be most likely to occur when the ratio of
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is too
the Courts has
two levels of
of fresh
career
The
of Appeal adopted a
f
plan
conceived of at that
, the role of
central staff
cases deemed 'routine,' and after
appropriate research
prepare comprehensive memoranda and
opinions in those
The staff memorandum and draft
submitted to a
the Court which assumes responsibility
approving the staff
, referring it back for further work, or (at
the request of any of the three judges) assigning the case to a
member of the panel for conventional treatment."* This diversion
of "routine" cases to central staff is intended to reserve more
judicial time for cases involving substantive issues. However, it
has been criticized
usurpation of a judicial function by
non-judicial personnel. While conceding that the expanded role of
the legal staff is convenient and may increase judicial productivity,
some commentators argue that the cost is too great: i.e., the quality
of justice rendered
fers and the public acceptance of the court's
opinions is diminished.
Other experts, such as Bernard Witkin, disagree. They argue
that the volume of.
late cases is so great that an expert professional research
is crucial to judicial efficiency and that
the court does not actually delegate judicial functions. The authority
to decide cases remains with the justices, only the task of stating
the reasons for dec
is delegated and the products are "carefully
considered decisions that follow the controlling statutory and
decisional law."**
ISSUES CONCERNING APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES
Proposals relating to criminal cases generally aim at the
perceived problem that there are too many meritless appeals. Several
approaches to this problem may be raised at the hearing:
1.

Expedited Handling. Some have proposed that the
court be permitted to dispense with full written
opinions in cases which raise no valid issues.
It is
that oral opinions from the bench or

*"Report of the Chief Justice's Special Committee on
Appellate Practices and Procedures in the First Appellate District,"
April 21, 1981, p. 15.
**"Witkin on Appellate Court Attorneys," California State
Bar Journal, March/April 1979.
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summary affirmances by written memorandum could
save substantial court time. The State Constitution
currently requires a written opinion with the
reasons stated (Art. VI, Sec. 14). Opponents of
this approach express concern that the quality of
decision-making might suffer if a written opinion
were not required.
They also question whether a
significant amount of judicial time would be saved.
2.

Screening Appeals. Another approach is to limit the
number of appeals by screening which cases may be
appealed. One Attorney General sponsored bill
(SB 1197, Doolittle) would have required the trial
court to decide whether or not a case raised
sufficient issues to justify an appeal. The Judiciary
Committee has not yet taken action on the bill. A
copy of the Committee's analysis is attached (Exhibit 7).

3.

Discouraging Appeals by Indigents. Professor Myron
Moskovitz has suggested an unusual approach that
seeks to discourage indigent defendants from filing
meritless appeals. Under his proposal, an indigent
would be credited with a certain sum of money. If he
appealed, the money would go toward the costs of
appeal.
If he did not appeal, the money could be
used by the inmate for expenses in prison. A copy
of his proposal is attached (Exhibit 8). The attachment includes a compilation of relevant statistics.

GG/RL/RL:df
Attachments
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EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT 6

REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S SPECIJI..L COMMITTEE
ON APPELLA'I'E PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
IN THE FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
SUMMARY

A.

The special committee finds:
,.,-···

1.
Appellate caseload is growing steadily.
2.
Such techniques as the use of central staff
for dealing with increased appellate caseload without a
corresponding increase in judgeships have facilitated the
work of the courts, but have created some appearance of
diminished judicial control over the appellate decisionmaking process, and have reached the limit of their
effectiveness.
3.
Appellate caseloads per judge are already

excessive.
4.
It does not now appear to be necessary or
practical to make any material change in the law providing
for the right to appeal. ·
5.
Some measures to discourage appeals taken
solely for the purpose of delay would be appropriate.
6.
Some measures can be taken to speed appeals
without sacrificing the quality of the decision-making
process.
B.

For reAsons discussed in the full report, the special
comnuttee therefor-e reconm1ends that:

New court of Appeal judgeships should be
created over the next several years so as to reduce the workload per judge to an average of 75 to 85 majority opinions
1.

per year. The Legislature should immediately add at least
four judgeships for the First Appellate District.
2.
If workload is· reduced to the level suggested

1
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.in (1}, the Courts of Appeal should consider mandatory court
decision conference

s which will assure an oral

three-judge discuss

case

ior to filing of an

opinion.
3.

conferences should be held

sufficiently in advance of
tion to counsel of

argument to permit notificacourt particularly

wishes discussed at
4.

two personal research attar-

There

neys available per judge.

staff should not exceed

one attorney per two judges.
5.

A rule should be adopted requiring conform-

ance with the general

of naming, in a footnote

the opinion, the judges

to

ipated in the decision of

a "by the court" case.

6.
Legislation should set postjudgment interest
rates in civil cases to
maximum allowed under the state
Constitution.
7.
Legis
provide for the automatic
award, as costs to the

party in a civil appeal, of

attorneys' fees of not less than $500 and not more than $1,500.

8.
The time to appeal in criminal cases should be
reduced from 60 to 30 days.

9.

Transcript preparation in criminal cases should

begin, automatically, upon conviction after trial (unless otherwise ordered) , and upon conviction based on a plea if ordered
by the trial court.
10.

In cr

1

that the record on appeal

s, the rules should provide
include closing arguments,

oral instructions, and
ings under section 1538.

in suppression hearPenal Code; and the clerk's

transcript should inc

trial motions and

written instructions.
11 •.
be expanded.

The use of computer-aided transcription should
There should

limited experiment in producing
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_transcript from sound recordings. The Judicial Council should
review means of assigning cour~ reporters in trial courts so
as to reduce delays in prepa~ing reporters' transcripts on
appeal.
12. A 50-page limit should be imposed on briefs,
regardless of the method of preparation (with longer briefs
permitted on special application). Briefs should be required to give page references to the record indicating
where points on appeal were preserved.
13. Each Court of Appeal should adopt a strict
polic~t on extension of time for filing briefs and apply the
policy uniformly. In civil cases, the parties should not be
permitted to stipulate (without court approval) for extensions c:>f more than 30 days for the filing of briefs.
14. Each Court of Appeal should develop procedures to identify defective briefs as soon as possible. after
filing, and in any event, before the case is placed on
calendar.
15. The First Appellate District sh9.uld have a
properly located law library staffed by a full-time professional law librarian.
16. A Rule of Professional Conduct should be considered to require counsel on appeal to notify their clients
of the Court of Appeal decision and of the deadline for seeking a hearing in the Supreme Court.
17. Each court's procedures for handling emergency writ applications should be publicized.
18. Rule l4(b) should be amended to clarify the
procedure and criteria governing amicus curiae briefs.

EXHIBIT 7

SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

1981-82 Regular Session

s

SB 1197 (Doolittle)
As introduced
Penal Code
JGD

B

1
1
9
7

CRIMINAL APPEALS
-CERTIFICATION OF MERITHISTORY
Source:

Attorney General

Prior Legislation:
Support:

None

Unknown

Opposition:

State Public Defender
KEY ISSUE

SHOULD APPEAL AFTER CONVICTION BE CONDITIONED ON A
CERTIFICATION OF MERIT FROM THE TRIAL COURT?
PURPOSE
Existing law authorizes every defendant convicted of
a criminal offense to appeal as a matter of right.
This bill would condition appeal on certification by
the trial judge that the defendant has raised an
issue or issues that may necessitate reversal of
the conviction.
The purpose of the bill is to attempt to reduce the
volume of criminal appeals.

(More)

s

SB 1197 (Doolittle)
Page Two

B
1
1

COMMENT

9
7

1.

Certification procedure
(a)

Appeals from guilty plea
Existing law limits the right of appeal of
an offender who pleads guilty to only those
cases wherein a judge files a certificate
of probable cause with the county clerk,
based on the defendant having shown "reasonable
grounds" for the appeal (P.C. Sec. 1237.5).
This bill would establish an even stricter
test for defendants who consistently maintained their innocence.
IS THIS THE AUTHOR'S
INTENT?
J

(b)

Self-criticism for trial judges
•

This bill requires the defendant to convince
the trial judge to certify the case for
appeal, unless the trial judge was not
available.
In most cases appeals are predicated upon
one. form or another of judicial error.
This bill would therefore require that a
defendant convince the trial judge he or
she may have erred in order to be granted
an appeal. Moreover, this bill would
require that a judge certify not only
that he or she may arguably have erred,
but that the error might not have been
harmless and could therefore result in
reversal on appeal.
IS IT REALISTIC TO EXPECT TRIAL JUDGES TO
INVITE REVERSAL OF THEIR DECISIONS?
(More)
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SB 1197 (Doo
Page Three

IF A 'I'RIAL
SPOULD I'!' "'1()'1"
NEW TRIAL?
(c)

s

ttle

B

TO MAKE SUCH A FINDING
MOST CASES SIMPLY GRANT A

Non-appealability of certification denial
The trial court order denying appeal would
only be
writ to the Court
of Appeal.
by the Court of
Appeal a
not be taken to the
Supreme Court.

2.

More complicated than present procedure
Proponents contend
by this bill would
criminal appeals,
time and resources.
looked, however the
on trial courts.

the procedure established
the number of frivolous
saving appellate court
apparently overthis bill would have

In addition, and
to, a motion for new
trial this bill wnul
re, in effect, that
the appeal be made
trial court. All
issues that would normal
be considered on
appeal would first have to be argued before the
trial judge, whc would not only have to rule on
their probable
, but on whether or not
any alleged errors were or were not harmless in
terms of impact on the verdict. Such determinations waul~ require briefing by the parties,
complete with references to the record, and,
finally, t>ral
SHOULD T1(IAL JUDGES
TIME AND RESOURCES

RED TO SPEND THEIR
APPELLATE ARGUMENTS?

Only afUer the tri
would the defendant
for writ: of

had denied certification
able to make application
appellate court.
(More')

1
1
9
7

s

SB 1197 (Doolittle)
Page Four

B

SHOULD A TWO-STEP PROCEDURE (MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL AND APPEAL) BE REPLACED BY A FOURT-STEP
PROCEDURE (MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, APPLICATION
FOR CERTIFICATION, APPLICATION FOR WRIT, AND
APPEAL) IN THE NAME OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY?
3.

Alternative approach
Another way of accomplishing the goal of making
appeals discretionary without at the same time
institutionalizing an unwieldy certification
procedure would be to institute certiorari review,
whereby the Court of Appeal would be given
authority to deny applications for appeal after
reviewing an applicant's written arguments.
WOULD THIS NOT BE A SIMPLER, MORE EFFECTIVE
METHOD OF INSTITUTING DISCRETIONARY REVIEW?

**********
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1
1
9
7

EXHIBIT C

SENATE

An act to
and 1237.4

SB 1197, as
Under
judgment of
the defendant
unless the
for the appeaL
This bill
judgment of
the court
The bill would
or deny the
Vote:

cause

The

SECTION
1
2 amended
1237.
3
4 an appeal
1. From a
5
6 provided
7 probation,
8 insanity,
9 defendant
10 deemed to
11 section.

is

99 40

SB 1197

•

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
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addiction shall be deemed to be a final judgment within 1
the meaning of this section 90 days after such
commitment. Upon appeal from a final judgment the
court may review any order denying a motion for a new
trial.
2. From any order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.
SEC. 2. Section 1237.3 is added to the Penal Code, to
read:
1237.3. Notwithstanding Section 1237, no appeal may
be taken without first securing a certificate of appeal
from the court before which the matter was heard as
prescribed in Section 1237.4.
SEC. 3. Section 1237.4 is added to the Penal Code, to
read:
1237.4. (a) No appeal may be taken by the defendant
under Section 1237 without first securing a certificate of
appeal from the court before which the matter was
heard. The certificate may only be granted upon
application by the prospective appellant filed within 60 (
days of the courfs judgment, or date of entry of the order
appealed from. The application shall set forth with
particularity all errors of law asserted to have been
committed by the trial court and all issues of law and fact
to be raised on appeal.
(b) The application for certificate of appeal shall be
determined by the judge who presided at the trial;
provided, however, that in case of the inability of that
judge to determine the application the same shall be
determined by any other judge of the same court.
(c) The application shall be granted if it raises
arguable issues of law which, if determined meritorious
by the court of appeal, could necessitate reversal or
modification of the judgment.
(d) An order granting the certificate of appeal shall
not be an appealable order and shall not be otherwise
subject to review by the court of appeal or supreme court.
The denial of an application may be reviewed only if the
application was timely filed and then only in the court of
appeal by writ of mandate filed within 30 days of the '

99 60
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SB 1197
1 denial of

appeal.

9960

EXHIBIT D
EXHIBIT 8

Prooosal for Test and Ev<i1uation
TncPntives
to Reduce
---- of
.
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the !';umber of Indi

•

~

nt Criminal Aooeals

by Myron Moskovitz
Professor of Law

Golden Gate University
San Francisco, California

July 21, 1981

GOLDE;\; GATE UNIVERSITY 5.36 :<.fission Street • San francisco • Caliiornia 9~10.') • Telephone (~15) 442·7000
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I.

Suwrnarv of Proposal
To investigate the possibility of saving the California judicial system
veral million dollars each year by giving indigent convicted felons a monetary

incentive not to appeal Y.'hich is similar to the monetary incentive which
per a tes on non-indigent litigants, Y.'here such appeals are unlikely to succeed.
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The Problem

I

1963, the United States Supreme Court held that indigent criminal

defendants h:1ve the right to counsel (paid by the state) on appeal, without
a preliminary showing that the appeal would be meritorious.

1

Since then, the number of criminal appeals has increased substantially,
more than the number of civil appeals.
ports the following:

The California Judicial Council

2

Civil Appeals

1959-60

1969-70

1979-80

1, 3 39

1, 981

4,249

720

2,562

4,586

Criminal Appeals

Of the 4,586 criminal appeals filed in 1979-80, 4,191 (91.4%) were filed

. d.1gents. 3
1n
The nuwber of

cri~inal

3ppeals may be expected to rise even further in

the next few years, because of the current legislative penchant for increased
sentences and mandatory state prison terms.
of these appeals are either completely without merit or are marginal.
ts 1980 Annual Report (at page 60), the Judicial Council noted that "relatively
[criminal appeals] are successful."
riminal appeals in 1978-79.

8

The Court of Appeal wrote opinions

77% were affirmances in full.

ffirmances with modifications.

Only 11% were reversals.

Another
Id. at

In addition, in 1978-79, only 9% of the criminal appeals resulted
inions which the Court felt were important enough to publish (as compared

25% in

ivil cases).

Id. at page 64.

_a_s_~_Califo_T_nia,

372 U.S. 353 (1963).

figures appear in the Annual Reports published by the Judicial

terview with Administrator of State Public Defender's Office, June
and 18, 1981.
_qq_

- 3 The

proble~

has been of sufficient dimension to cause both the United

ius truct i ng appP.llate counsel

4

and the Court of Appeal

5

on how to handle

appeals.

~orthless

Worthless and marginal criminal appeals impose both monetary and
nonmonetary costs on at least four major institutions in the judicial
system.
Trial Courts
Almost every time a notice of appral is fi1Pd by :m incHgent

crimin<~l

dt>fvntbnt, both a rt•porter's transcript and a clPrk's tr«nscript must be

prepared.

6

If the trial has been lengthy, the reporter's transcript can

be quite expensive, costing several thousand dollars.
Appellate Courts
Appellate Courts are expensive.

According to the California Judicial

Council, the total budget for the Courts of Appeal in California for 1979-80
was $15,443,000, and these courts issued 6,659 written opinions during this
7
period. This averages out to $2,319 per written opinion.

4

6

See Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Feggans (1967)
Cal. 2d 444.
5
6

See

f_(?~_le

v. \\'ende (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 436.

See California Rules of Court, Rules 35 and 36.

7

This figure may be slightly overstated, as it does not take into account
duties performed by the Courts of Appeal which do not result in written
opinions--such as revie~ing oetitions for writs of mandate and habeas corpus.
Nevertheless, these other duties do not take a major part of the Courts'
time, so the above figure is probably fairly accurate.
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One might expect this figure to be lower for nonmeritorious appeals,
sin

there are fewer (if any) legal issues to rcvir>w in such cases.

But this

avings in work might be offset by a special burden which the Courts must bear
in such cases (and no other cases):

"to conduct a review of the entire record"

8
f or 1tse
.
lf wet
h h er t h ere are are any argua bl y meritor1ous
.
.
.
to d eterm1ne
1ssues.

Nonmeritorious and marginal appeals also have several nonmonetary effects
appe]

late courts:

e If the increase in such nppeals is faster than the :1ppointment

of new judges, the rising workload might affect the quality
of work of the appellate courts. (Mr. Justice Compton of the
Court of Appeal for the Second District recently noted that
"there is concern that the quality of justice is being diminished
by appellate backlog with its attendant delay."lO)
• Appellate court judges might become skeptical of the merit of all
indigent appeals.

8

v

Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.

9

Governor Brown's 1981-82 budget proposal states that: "In the past decade,
increases in the number of judges on the Courts of Appeal have lagged far
behind the increase in ~he caseloads of those courts. Total filings in the
Courts of Appeal rose by 847. between 1969-70 and 1979-80; the number of
increased by only 23%. In 1969-70 there was a total of 48 judges on
the 5 Courts of Appeal; in 1979-80 the number had grown to 59. In the former
ea there was an average of 157 filings per judge; by 1979-80 the average had
r sen to 250." !-os Angeles Dai~ournal, January 13, 1981, page 1. (The
Governor requested additional annual appropriations of $1,781,550 for 15 more
:1ppellate judges--plus $1,963,360 for more law clerks. Ibid.) Similar increases
n filings per judge have been reported in Colorado, New Jersey, Virginia,
and Oregon. Martin & Prescott, The Problem of Delav in the Colorado
58 Denver Law Journal 1, 3-4 (1980).
(1981) 118 Cal. App. 3d 278, 290.
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• Since criminal cases are given priority on appea1, 11 civil litigants
may have their cases substantially delayed. According to Mr. Justice
Christian of the Court of Appeal for the First District, "at the
present time a nonpriority civil case must wait between 16 and 18 months,
depending upon the division in which it is pending, after the filing
of the last brief before being calendared for oral argument."12 This
aff0cts not only the litigants, but also the public, which needs to
have unsettled issues of civil law resolved expeditiously. Although
crit!1in;Jl c.1ses have priority, they too can be d£>1ayed by their heavy
IHHJ:l,..rs-·-;Js much as 8 months bC>t'v.'f•(·n the filing of brjpfs ~md issuance
of op1nion. 1 3 This might have the follov.'ing effects:
(1) if the case
is reversed for dismissal, delay may cause a presumably innocent inmate
to serve unnecessary time (except in the rare case in which he was
released on bail during the appeal--see California Penal Code §§ 1243-44,
1272), (2) if the case is reversed for retrial, delay can cause loss
of evidence to prosecution or defense, (3) delay could actually discourage
meritorious appeals, where the sentence would be served before the appeal
could be heard and decided.

In California, indigent criminal appellants are represented either by
private attorneys (who volunteer for appointment by the appellate courts)
or by the State Public Defender.

The cost to the st;'lte for the private

attorneys is not too great--about $750 per case--mainly because we pay them
so poorly.

14

The State Public Defender's Office--which uses full-time

specialists in criminal appeals and handles about 37% of the indigent appeals
--has estimated its costs at an average of about $2,804 per appea1. 15
\.Jortbless cases might cost a bit less. as there are fewer issues to brief.
Even in these cases, however, the attorney must spend substantial time reading
the transcript and researching some law.

11

12

The Administrator of the State

California Judicial Cnunci 1, 1980 Annual Report, page 63.
Christian, "Reducing Delay in the Courts," 56 California State Bar Journal
See also California Judicial Council, 1980 Annual Report, page 64.

120 (1981).
13

California Judicial Council, 1980 Annual Report, page 64.

14

See footnote 3, supra. Compensation is authorized by California Penal
Code ~ 1241.
15 The Ac~inistrator of the State Public Defender's Office indicated that some
Court of Ap?eal clerks assign cases to the State Public Defenders--rather than
private counsel--where the appeal involves large transcripts and/or difficult
issues. He also stated that the State Public Defender had a reversal rate of
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Public Defender's Office estimates that worthless appeals, in which ''Anders
briefs" are filed (about 6% of their caseload), involve about the same amount
of work as other appeals.
There may also be nonmonetary costs:

(1) heavy caseloads might affect

the quality of work, (2) handling a lot of "dead-bang losers"

may be bad

for morale, resulting in excessive turnover of attorneys, and (3) facing
judges who may have become skeptical about the merits of indigent criminal
appeals can also be quite disheartening.

Prosecuting Attorneys:

In California, all felony appeals are handled

by the Attorney General's Office.

The effect of nonmeritorious and marginal

appeals on its budget and quality of work may be similar to the effect on the
State Public Defender's Office.

Currently, the Attorney General's budget

office estimates that each appeal costs them an average of $2,110.
In sum, the total cost of the usual indigent criminal appeal may be
estimated at between $6,179 and $8,233.

(This is based on $1,000 for

transcripts, between $750 and $2,804 for appellant's counsel, $2,110 for
the Attorney General, and $2,319 for the Court of Appeal.)
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III. Possible

A.
n non-indigen

riminal), the

use of various proc

i

fees in order to
appeal.

ce

d

regulator of the

that the client must pay attorney's

t

whether it be discovery, a jury trial, or an

The attorney advises the

lient as to how likely the procedural device

is to further the client's interests and how much the device will cost.
client then balances

se considerations and makes a decision.l6

appeal has a 30% chan e
might clecide to
is

~hsvnt.

.

S\Jcces
the appeal.

Except in very

and absolutely nothing

The

If a criminal

but will cost him his life's savings, he
Tn intligent criminal <lppe:~ls, th:is regulator

re ci"!ses,l7 •·very indigent has everything to gain

o lose

ing, whether his chance of "'inning is

30%, 3%, or one in a million.
There are s

indications that this is exactly how the inmates see it.

\,fhile the chance of reversal on appeal is generally ratl1er lC>w (see page 2,
ra , nevertheless, it appears that a very large percentage of defendants

--'----'

appeal.

In 19

82%

.dispositions" were
civil cases 20).

18

of all

court "contested criminal
to a 14% appeal rate for contested

Of the convictions that followed a contested trial, an

1

Posner
Ad.'Ttini stration,

to Legal Procedures and Judicial
Studies 399, 430-4 31 ( 1973).
at trial, but the trial court
minimum, filing an appeal could

o~~itted

imposed a sentence
be risky busines .

Calif. Judicial Council, 1980
"r:ote that this does not necessarily
dispositions actually appealed.
For

tionship

of guilty, a few of which were
to show th~ general rela·
rior court dispositions. "(err::>hasis added}
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- 8 The premise of this study is that if a cost regulator is properly
plugge<i into this si.tu:1tion, m:my iudigt•nt
appeals

~here

il1ln:llt•s

I.Ji.ll J,,ci<ie to forego

the chance of success is so low that most non-indigents

would do the same, without feeling that they have lost valuable rights.
The proponent is aware of no study, experiment, or practice which has
put this premise to the test in indigent criminal appeals--or, for that
matter, in any aspect of the criminal justice system.
The function of payment as a cost regulator has, however, been tested
in the field of medical services.

In 1972-73, the California Department of

Health conducted an experiment on "copayment" in the Hedi-Cal program.

An

extensive report on this experiment appears in Brian & Gibbens, ''California's
~edi-Cal

1974).

Copayment Experiment'', 12 Hcdical Care (Special Supplement, December
About 30% of those eligible for Medi-Cal were required to pay one

dollar for each of their first 2 visits to a doctor each month and SO¢ for
each of their first 2 drug prescriptions each month.
only for people who could "afford it".

Id at p.l.

Copayment was required
Even though the dollar

and 50¢ requirements were viewed as "minimal" deterents, the report concluded
. that:
The overall pattern revealed shows that copayment had an effect
and the effect was toward lower utilization (of medical services)
particularly for less critical services.

[rd. at p. 561 22

The only negative aspect of copayment was that it appeared to cause a
duction in the use of preventive (as opposed to corrective) health
care services. IA.:_ at p. 56.
22 A

.
. i on was once vo1ce
. d by S1gmund
.
more su b.Ject1ve
op1n
Freud, who said that
fees gave a patient an incentive to terminate psychoanalysis when he or she
felt "cured" (or hopeless). See ~ew York ~fagazine, Xovember 24, 1980, page 77.
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It might be noted that the California Legislature recently adopted a
copayment plan which would require most Medi-Cal recipients to pay $1 for
each doctor visit, $1 for each drug prescription, and S5 for each hospital
emergency room visit \..'here the visit \,'as not in fact for an emergency.
copayment plan is expected to save the state $45 million in 1981-82.
B.

P;-,_::I~C:_!"!_~_from ~'Clf_C~

In \::11ifornia,
of work for pay.
>Wrked in

11

db(>ut

J_or:_Work _i_n Cus_to_d):

This

23

24

h.1lf of the state prison population does some sort

In 1981, there were 25,600 inmates.

Of these, about 8,700

\Jork support" positions (kitchen, laundry, etc.), 345 "-'Orked in

"in.rr.ate welfare" positions (e.g., the prison canteen), 2,150 worked in the
prison industries program (maufacture of license plates, flags, furniture,
etc.), and 1,500 \Jorked in conservation camps (doing forestry and firefighting).
Pay ranged from 5c to 35c per hout, depending on the skill required and the
inmate's seniority.
The V;jges may be spent at the prison canteen on cigarettes, candy, small
"luxury" items {like cologne), and even small appliances such as radios.

}lost

inmates want to have such items occasionally, so they \JOuld like to some money,
even the small amounts which are paid for prison work.

Thus, the jobs are much

sought after, and prison officials do not hzve enough jobs for all inmates
who ...:ant them.
One's initial impression might be that if an indigent inmate had to pay a
portion of his prison wages towards the costs of his appeal, we would have an
effective cost regulator similar to that faced by non-indigent inmates.

Such

a requirement should be constitutional, since the inmate is still being provided
with all the necessities of life, free of charge.

(One official stated, "A man

can serve his entire term without spending a penny.")

23

san Francisco Examiner and Chronicle, June 14, 1981, page 4.

24

All figt1res in this section are from an intervie"-' "-'i th George 'i,'arner of the
California Department of Correction, on ~lay 18, 1981.
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The portion of wages taken should be set at a percentage high enough
to m;Jke the in::1ate feel he is giving up something substnntial if he appeals,
but not so high as to discourage him from working or pursuing a potentially
meritorious appeal.

Perhaps something like a third of his wages for one year

would be appropriate, or maybe a sliding scale (depending on wages) would be
better.
Preliminary research indicates that this scheme will not work, at least
in the California prison system.

The problem is one of timing.

Since the

jobs are desirable, and there is only one job for every two inmates, the
newer inmates may have to wait some time for a job opening.

Even if a new

inmate gets a job, he will probably start at a very low pay, near 5¢ an hour.
Also, every new inmate

spe1~ds

some time initially at one of the reception

enters--Vacaville or Chino--where there is very little likelihood of work
for him.

This is where he is likely to be when the time for filing notice

of appeal runs.
~to

The net result is that, at the time when the inmate is called

decide whether to appeal, he is either working at a very low-paying

ob or--most likely--not working at all.

In this situation, he has little

to give up in return for appealing.

A possible way around this problem would be to require the inmate who
ides to ;1ppeal to agrc•e to pay part of his wages in the f_u_t_u_r_~. when he
t:('t :t

ldghl•r·p:Iying Job.

Cnrrl•!'! ional

offic!<1ls indicate that this

will not work, because most inmates have trouble relating to future consequences:

"If these guys could plan ahead, they wouldn't be here," said

25

25
"In::Jates in the prison system, generally, •.. have very little patience to
rk for or wait for the things they desire." Report to the Director, California
Department of Corrections, "Team for Inmate Hork Training Expansion Programs,"
~arch 15, 1981, at pp. 12-13.
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C.

Pavmen t from an "Inmate Appeal Fund"

The essence of this idea is simple:

if the inmate doesn't have the money

to serve as a cost-regulator, let's give it to him.
\\'hile the above conclusion was reached independently by the proponent, he
later discovered that he had been preceded by a very thoughtful discussion of
this concept, in Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg, Justice on Aopeal, at pages
91-95

(\~est,

1976).

26

There, the authors propose establishing a "Criminal

Defense and Rehabilitation· Fund," which would "give the indigent defendant
something to lose in the appeal similar to that v.•hich tbe non-indigent hDs."
Id. at 93.

They further state:

This plan would force the defendant to think about his case as a
non-indigent must. The plan would not treat indigents less favorably. Indl'cd it V.'imld afford tlH'm a fin:mc1a1 ],PnPfit not no\J
:lV; li

1 . 1h 1 e •

[ T cl • a t 9 I~ ] •

\.Jldle Carrington, et al, set out the basic concept,

they do not discuss

the many important details that would have to go into such a system.

This

proposal--if funded--would attempt to develop those details.
Here is ho\J such a

syste~

might work in California:

Step 1:

1--'henever a defendant is sentenced to state prison, $200
is deposited by the state into his "inmate appeal fund."
He may not spend any of this money--yet.

Step 2:

After his trial attorney consults with him regarding
whether an appeal might be successful,27 the inmate
dPcidl'S wlwther to file a notice of appe>al. If he
allows the time for filing a notice of appeal to pass
v:ithout filing, he gets to spend or keep the $200 as
he wishes.28 If he files a notice of appeal, a clerk's
transcript and (usually) a reporter's t~anscript must
be preparf'd, \,•hfch costs money. 'Therefore, a "transcript
fee" of $100 v.•ill be deducted from the appeal fund. The
inmate still cannot spend the remaining $100--yet.

26Mr. Justice Winslow Christian also referred to this notion at 56 California
State Bar Journal 121-122 (1981).
27 This consultation is already required by California Penal Code s1240.1.
28 subject to reasonable prison regulations. For example, it might be wise
to provide that he cannot spend more than $50 a month, and that he can have it
only in the form of credits at the prison CJnteen, or on his release, or send
it to his family.
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Step 3:

Appellate counsel is appointed, who reads the transcripts
and consults \vi th the inmate. The inmate may then continue
the appeal or dismiss it. If he fails to sign a dismissal
within (say) a week after the consultation, the appellate
counsel will begin work on the opening brief, and an
"appellate counsel's fee" of $100 will be deducted from the
appeal fund. If the inmate signs the dismissal in time,
he may then keep or spend the remaining $100.

If this system induces a mere 10% of the state prison irunates who now
appeal not to appeal, the savings to the state will be substantial.

11,000 people are sentenced to state prison each year.

About

Records on how many

of these appeal are not presently kept, but it has been suggested that a
large number do so.

Let us assume that 4,000

29 .
1nmates appeal.

assume that each appeal costs the state about 7,000

30

court, attorney general, and appellant's counsel).

Let us also

(for the appellate

The state would have

to pay $2,200,000 to provide $200 appeal funds for the 11,000 inmates.

If

10% of the 4,000 who would appeal decide not to appeal, then the state saves
400 times

$7,00~

or $2.8 million.

In addition, the state gets back $720,000

from the 3,600 inmates who go ahead with their appeals and forfeit the $200.
The state comes out ahead by over $1.3 8illion every year.
If the appeal fund system induces more than 10% to decide not to pursue
s, the savings increase dramatically:
Annual Savings

10%

$1,320,000

20%

$4,040,000

30%

$6,760,000

40%

$9,480,000

50%

$12,200,000

29

The Administrator of the State Public Defender's Office said that almost
all of their clients are in state prison. Therefore, since there were 4,586
criminal appeals in 1979-80, it is fair to assume that 4,000 of these came
from prison inmates.

30 Th is $7,000 figure is roughly the sum of the usual costs of the transcripts
($1,000), the appellant's counsel ($750-$2,804), the Attorney General ($2,110),
+_.,-

t

t-'k"""

r ....... _ .. ""'

. . . 4=

, __ ...... _,
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This, of course, is in addition to the nonmonetary, qualitative benefits
to the state discussed earlier.
Before such a system should be established statewide in California prisons,
seve~·al

need to he explored.

js~;ues

First, the figures mentioned in this proposal should be confirmed or
amended, in order to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of the propesed
system.

\&ere present record-keeping practices do not keep track of certain

important figures, additional record-keeping may be recommended.
Second, an attempt should be m3de to set an amount for the appeal fund
which is proper:

not so high as to induce inmates to drop appeals which have

a decent chance of succPss, ;md not so 1ow as to be cons:ids'red trivial by
the inm;itcs.
criteria.

'11H'

$700 nwntioned <1bove

$500--or

$100--migh~

\<:1s

a visceral <ittempt to meet these

well be a more appropriate figure.

Third, we must ensure that indigent inmates will be at least as well
advised as their non-indigent counterparts regarding the possible success
of an appeal.

Presently, such advice must be given by trial counsel under

Penal Code s 1240.1, but not by appellate counsel, who usually has no particular
reason to advise his client that the appeal has little chance of success.
Fourth, we should examine whether the system should be applied to convicted
felons who receive probation (with or without county jail time).

These cases

apparently account for the bulk of felony convictions, but only a small portion
of appeals.
people?

Would the appeal fund system be cost effective if applied to these

(Excluding these people ·should raise no equal protection problem.

See In r_e ___?jm~ (1981) 117 Cal. App. 3d 309; _I_n__!"_<:_~<3.Y~__9_:_ (1979) 93 Cal. App. 3d
247, 252-255.).
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Fifth, should tl1e system be applied to juvenile appeals?
a significant number of appeals?

Do they constitute

Is there a way to focus on those juveniles who

file 'most of the appeals (e.g., those "sentenced" to California Youth P.ut!-lority)?
Is any "appeal fund" simply too tempting to an indigent juvenile inmate whose
ability to make intelligent decisions about his life is presumably quite dubious?

-111-
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IV.
A consultant on testing methodology will be retained to assist in designing
a pilot project to test and evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed system.
The pilot project might take the following form.

To facilitate evaluation,

the project should be confined to a single appellate district.
year period, all felons
district

~ill

~ho

be tracked.

are convicted

~~d

During a one

sentenced to state prison in that

Two hunered and fifty of these inmates (the test

group) "'ill reC'eive "~:}>peal funds"; the rest (the eontrol group) will receive
not.lling, <!IH'i

~.}JP:ir

ckcisiul1!>

rc·c.:,;;rc1in~

r:ppvnl will not lle affeeted by the project.

Of the 250 in the test g~oup, 50 will receive appeal funds of $500, .50 will
receive $Loo, 50 will receive $300, 50 will receive $200, and 50 will receive
$100.

EA.ch appeal fund will be divided into 2 parts ("transcript fee" and

"appellate counsel's fee") in accordance with the 3-step procedure described
earlier.

At the end of the year, we will determine whether. the percentages

of notices of appeal and opening briefs filed were different for any of the groups.
Smaller test and control groups involving convicted felons who were not
sentenced to state prison

~~d

juvenile offenders might also be selected.

To run the pilot project. we will need the cooperation of several
agencies:
l.

Slweri or Courts in the piJot district will 'b;,ve to 'inform
c'Jr~;ense c~:unsel of t.he project wh(·never the ccr,vict.ed
defendant has b0en ~elected for the test grou~, so that
defense counsel may take the appeal fund into account
when advising the defendant whether to file a notice of
appeal.

2.

The Court of Aupeal for the pilot district will have to
inform appellant's counsel of the project whenever
appellant is part of the test group, and instruct
counsel to consult with the appellant before preparing
the opening brief. If this requires an extension of the
ti~e for filing the opening brief. the Court should be
prepared to grant such extensions.

3.

The Denart~ent of Corrections will have to agree to
ad."":".inister the :ir.~ate appeal funds and esta"tlish
reasonatle ree::ulc-ti ons re>rardinf: the spending o'!:'
~oneys not forfeited.
,

1 ')_

-

V.

1U

-

Eve1luation

--~----

The consultants will keep track of filings by the test and control
groups, and at the end of the year will compute the totals and percentages
from each group who filed notices of appeal and opening briefs.

nu~nber

in the control group, after the opening brief has been filed,

tte cppeal has been dismissed, or the time for filing the notice of appeal

•

has run.

The

questior~aire

ng his appeal.

will ask the inmate what influenced his decision

Similar questionnaires will be sent to the inmate's

trial counsel and appellate

couns~l.

If the

ir~ate

decided not to pursue

an appeal, counsel should also be asked his opinion as to whether an appeal
would have been hopeless, carginal, or possibly successful.

·This will give

us some idea as to whether potentially meritorious appeals are being discouraged
by the appeal fund.

'Thour;h this would

dc~lay

ccmpl(:tinn of the cv«luation for several months

(at least), it would also be helpful to track the success rate of those inmates
in all groups who go through with their appeals.

If the project succeeds in

discouraging mainly hopeless and margi!1al appeals by the test groups, then one
would expect that those innates in the test groups who do follow through on
their anneals will have a higher percentage of reversals and
ants in the control group.

~odifications

than

Also, it should be surprising if any

----- briefs are filed by members of the test groups.
should try to discover the reason for this.

-113-

If any are filed,
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VI.

Results

.t:..t ti:e end of the eva1uation, a report will be prepared.

The report will

desc::ibe the pu::?ose of the p:ilot project, :its methodology, ?.nd the results
of t!1e

evc:1uP.~ion.

If the results look promising, the report may recor-'Tlend

legisl;;.t:ion edopting the

in::~e.te

appeal fund system on a statewide basis.

-114-

Vli. -Advisory
_,._ .

Com1:~i ttee

_·-·-·-~·-

It would be very helpful to have :m Advisory Committee, !'lade up of
representatives from participating and interested agencies, to help set
up the pilot project and the evaluation, and later to review the results
and

~ake

reco~~endations.

At a minimum, the following agencies should be

requested to send representatives to the Advisory Committee:

the Judicial

Council, the Court of Appeal for the pilot district, the Attorney General,
the State Public Defender, and the

Depart~ent

of Corrections.

Other people

wno show particular interest or expertise regarding this matter reay also
be invited to be members of the Advisory Ccmmittee.

'
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\llll.Timetable
After this proposal is funded, it should take no more than 4 months to
retain a tonsultant on testing methodology, assemble an Advisory Co111mittc>e,
and design the pilot project.
another two months.

To put the pilot project in place would take

The pilot project will then operate for 12 months.

Evaluation should take no more than another 3 months, although if we wish
to include d.1ta on

rf'ver~;a1

r;Jtes,

this v.'i1l take .:hnut ;>nothcr year.

Prt'p.lt.Jtiun of the final r"purl shollld

t;1ke ;Jbnut 4 lllonths (tho11gh much

of this can be done '-Yhile \.Je are \.;ai ting for the reversal statistics).
In sum, the final report should be ready no later than 32 months after
the proposal is funded.

TX.

Rud1•et
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'I'he cvaluatiun will be conducted under the auspices of Golden Gate
University, a

vate,

t institution of higher education, whose

main office is located at 5

Mission Street, San

442-7000.
for adn:d nis

Fr~~cisco,

California

The University will be responsible

the funds, and is willing to make in-kind contributions

to the evaluation.

XI.

--------Di

The director of the evaluation would be Myron Moskovitz.

r~.

Moskovitz

is currently a Professor of Law at Golden Gate University and ChairDan of the
State Commission of Housing and Commun

Development.

He received his L.L.B.

with honors from Boalt Hall in 1964, served as law clerk to Mr. Justice Ray
Peters of the California Supreme Court, was Directing Attorney of the
Marysville Office of California Jural Legal Assistance, Inc., and Chief
Attorney of the National Housing Law Project.

He has published extensively

and has handled many cases in the California appellate courts.
resume is attached as Appendix II.

-117-

His complete

PROPOSED BUDGET

___p_~ J-lo_I:!_t:h_~In-Kind
Contributions

Cash
Subtotal
I.

Total

Consultants
Director
(400 hours @ $80 per hour)

$32,000

Consultant on testing methodology
(100 hours@ $80 per hour)

8,000

One research assistant
(400 hours @ $10 per hour)

4,000

One executive secretary
(200 hours @ $10 per hour)

2,000
$46,000

II.

Travel
Mileage (7500 miles @ $0.20 per mile)

1,500

Per Diem (50 days @ $50 per day)

4,000

Telephone ($31.25 per month)

1,000

Copying

500

Postage

500

Space * (32 months @ $500 per month)

$16,000

Inmate appeal funds **

250 State prison inmates

75,000

Probationers and juveniles

10,000
27,400

Recipients indirect costs
(20% of total project cash costs
of $137,000)

114,400
$164,400

REQUESTED Fill\DING

*Space ~ill be contributed by rec1p1ent.
**All funds forfeited by inmates who choose to appeal
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~ill

be returned to the grantor.

EXHIBIT E

/I.SSS!1BI_ Y JUDICIARY At!D CPit1JfJAL JUSTICE rorHUTTEFS
JtHERH1

~~EARJNG

APPELLATE COUP-T EFFJCIEf·lCY
SAN DIEGO. CALIFORNIA
OCTOBER 15. 1981

f'HAIFH'iAiJ &

t1Er~RERS:

f1Y NM1E IS JOHN DAVIES. I At1
ADt1!tliSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS.

~JITH

THE

I APPREf!ATE THE

OPPOI1TUtHTY TO BE f IEI1E HITH YOU TODAY.

PURSUArlT TO THE COr1i1ITTEE'S H!VITATiotJ. I HAVE
PROVIOED YOUR Cot!SUL TMJTS lJITH DATA RELATING TO THE ItJCREASE
Irl APPEU_ATE UOPKLOAD AND PRODUCTIVITY.

JUST AS CALIFORfJIA' S POPULATION HAS ItlCREASED OVER
THE PAST 20 YEARS, SO HAS THE i·IUt'18F.R OF ATTORt!EY' S IN THE
'

STATE (TO 80,000), AS H/IS THE tJUt':BER OF TRIAL CCURT FILitJGS,
NJD, It! TURtl, APPEALS TO niE COlJRTS OF APPEAL IN THIS STATE.

OVER LAST 10-12 YEARS, THE rJUtmER OF CIVIL 1\t·JD

UUt1J1l/'.l_ 1\PPI-"/\I.S Hf,S GROt!t·l AT A.ROUT T!·IE Sl\t1E r;ATE, NJD TIUS
IS iiOT lJiJJC[IE TO CAI.IFOP!JJA.
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OCTOBEr 15, 1981
PAGE 2

DURitlG THE 11 YEAR PERIOD 19G7 -G8 TO 78-79, THERE
\JAS AN AVErAGE ArltlUAL ItJCnEASE RATE Itl CIVIL APPEf\LS OF
J\80UT 7h.
THE CRJt1ItlAL RATE OVER THIS Tit1E HAS ALSO BEEN ?% •
!flTEREST!t!GLY, THE GRotiTH PATE OVER A SUBSTAtlTIALL Y Sit1ILAR
PERIOD ItJ THE UtiiTED STATES tiiNTH CTRCUIT \·JAS A CLOSE 6.5%.

ItJ 1980
1980 SHm.JED A CHMJGE REPORTED IN OUR 1981 JUDICIAL

COliNCII_ REPORT, IN

~JHICH

CIVIL APPEALS ACCELLERATEn.

THE 1979-80 FIGURES SHOUED A 16% JUt1P OVER THE
PREVIOUS YF.J\R TO If, 2t~9 CIVIL A.PPEALS.

THIS OCCURRED AT THE SAt1E Tit:E THAT THE rHJfiBER OF
COtlTESTED SUPEFUOR COUf<T CIVIL ACTIOtJS DECI1EASED.
ItJCREASitJG THE PROPORTiotJ OF SIJPEf<IOR COURT COt'JTESTED
DJSPOSITiotJS T/\KEN ON APPEAL TO 17% FR0!1 1 Lf%.

Dll_THE Jfs_IlDJJAL_-'Sll2L_Tf 1EI:E \WRE '-i,!">PR CR:rt1JtJAL
t
, . ., ..,. s
'-. f
/\ Pnr"l
I

A 7

('l:''l:r:
"I I Y
J.l. l·li---
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. (.. j.)

Ttlr'f?F"<'r
.!t\'\.t'.\JL

I __Pfl_
'f-_-

1

0
0\fF:r:;
~\ Tlw
:r_ l)n[:\JTOtl
'',.v yr"R
r·.,.\,

'J TL! 1-I'E
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rl.-ll-'(r:
"'R
I
Lf
l \ 1-,-,,_.1
. .!D •

t~~l.D
t

OCTOBFJ~

15, 1931

PAGE :Z.

Ttl GF]JERAL THEtl, THE P./\ TES OF JrJCm:ASE otJ HIE CIVIL

MID CRit1It!AL SIDES HAVE UJCP.EASEO SifJCE 1970 AT M101JT 7%;
\·JITII THE LATEST REPORT YEAR STATISTICS SflotJitJG CIVIL JIJI1PitJG
1G% ArlO CfUtUt:AL ItlCf1EASit JG 7. 2%.

;HEPE 'S BEErJ A LotlG-RArJGE PRODUCTIVITY ItJCREASE BY APPELLATE
COURTS DURHJG THIS PERIOD OF JJJCRFASitJG

LOOK!fJG BACK OVER THE PERIOO.

~JORKLOAD

1~59-GO

TO 1979-80, t/E

FitiD THAT. TOTAL FILitJGS ItJ H!E COUf1TS~ OF 1\PPEAL OF THJS
1L~.757.

STATE IfJCREASED FIVE-FOLD, FRot1 1.899 TO

APPEALS ALotiE ItlCREASED TO 8.835, OR ABOUT L!.7
Tit1ES AS t1AtlY.
'

J;JRITTEI'J OPHJiotlS OUTPUT BY THE COURTS OF APPEAl ,
JlJt1PED lJ. G Tir1FS TO G, G59 FRot1 1, t:qo.

TilE tlllf1F3EP. OF JlJST!CES DUR!fiG TI:/\T Tit1E, HmJEVF.R,
It.Jf'REASEO FP.ot1 21 TO 59, OR 2. 8 TitlES.

CI.F f,RI_ Y. TilE AFPfTI 1\ TE COUfriS t!/\ VF~ DUJJ
:U:CPI- /\SHJGI_ Y PnODtJC IJVE, f<UT fJOT 0UITE SO
P!(~f?I·~~~F
<f\,.,

_,_!~.

*

f~UCH

1 r,c AJ'•J)1:11 f'-]·f: lli.Tf'l\ 'T(JrJ
PI
_J, .].f!r·
,r_ (.'llf'•\ITI
) \.1,
1
,1
1\1 I
_,,
_
....
•
~
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Jt1l~-

AS THE

Q(TQPEP. 1~, 1081
PAGE q

Pf1ESEfiTLY
THERE ARE A NUtlBER OF SYSTEt1-\JIOE CHAtlGES THAT HAVE
RFCEtJTL Y BEEN PUT JN PLACE IJHJCH SHOULD FACILITATE A t10RE
FFFICIEtJT, PP.OOUCTIVE APPELLATE SYSTH1.
FIRST, T! 1ArlKS TO CflAir;t1AtJ HARRIS, THERE UILL BE 1\tl
/\IJDITiot 1AL 3-JUDGE DIVISiotJ IrJ THE FIRST DISTRICT ( S. F.),
Af!D C t10RE JlJDGES HI THE SECOI'ID (L/\-SAtlTA

BAr~RARA

(3)): q ItJ

Tl !E FOURTH ( ORAI'lGE COUf'JTY); 2 IN THE FIFTH ( FREStJO); ArlO 3
IN THE tJEtJ GTH OISTRICT.

AS YOU

l~fJO\J,

THE STArlDARD APPLIED

It·l THAT CASE liAS 10S llRITTEtJ OPHJIONS PER JUDGE PER YEAR, UP
FfWf1 THE JllDICIAL COUNCIL'S OFFICIAL POLICY OF 95 PER JUDGE
PER YEAR, 9!1 STAtlDARD ADOPTED ItJ 1975 AtJD BASED Jtl PART ON
THE PECOt1t1EtJDATIOtJ OF THE tl/\ TiotlAL CEtJTER FOR STATE COURTS.

ADt1HJISTRATIVE 11EASURES HAVE IfJCUJDED:
1. l3Y CHIJF JUSTICE OIRECTION THERE'S GEDJ AfJ
ItlTRODUCTION OF Cot1PUTERIZED BlJSJJlESS PRACTil.ES, IrJCLUDHJG
lJORD PP.OC:ESSH!G. LEGAL RESEARCH (LEXIS), AtJD It! TilE tlEAR
FlJTllt;E nATA PROCESSI!!G noc!<ETIIJG BY TilE CI_FPK' s OFFICE.
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OCTOBER 15, 1081
PAGE S
APPonnr 1FtJT fl.t'D REPORT OF TilE cHJEF JIJSTICE 's

?. •

SPF.CJ AL COfHliTTEE otJ APPFLLATE

PRACT~CES

MlD PROCTDUPES Itl

THE FIP.ST APPELLATE DISTRICT - THE FEifJREPG - SELIGSotJ
Rf::PORT.
EACH OF YOU HAS RECEIVED EITHER A COPY OR A SUtlt1ARY
OF ITS FHJDitJGS AIJD COfJCLUSIOtJS, I BELIEVE.

THIS flATTER IS

TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE tJOVEt1RER JUDICIAL COutJCIL t1EETHJG.
ADOPTION OF T!IE 11ULE 21. 5, PROVIDHJG FOR THE

3.

COURTS TO DO CIRCUIT RIDH!G FOR THE CotlVErJIEtJCE OF THE
PARTIES AtlD THETR COUtJSEL AS A COIJRT PERCEIVES POSSIBLE f'IEED.

THE EFFECT OF THIS IS AS YET Ut:DETERt1ItlED,

~liTH

THE

FIRST EXERCISE TO OE IN SAtJ JOSE, BY THE FIRST DISTRICT
LATER THIS YEAR.
JUDICIAL COWJCIL HAS llTILIZED EIGHT PERt 1M lENT

4.

Lit1ITEO- Tr-J!t1 POSITIOrJS FOR SECotlD SO-CALLED "ELBOIJ-CIYPK"
ATTOPflEYS \tJITH SUCCESS:
.,f'E
TO lJl.TI T7E Tr;cc;r..
1
• DT\/T<:'TQfiS
_._ .. _._,
r , L \_.., r_ t.')i 1D
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PAGE G

SPFtlD SI

JFTCM~TLY t~OF:E

TH1E DOitJG "!t!ITI AL

PESEARCil" - UJOT SUGGESTED BY THE PAR-riES, A
CCL LEAGUE. OR RESEARCH ATTORtJEY):

SPHJD HJICE AS t1UCH Tit1E READitiG THE RECOF<D Irl CASES
~JAS

HE HAD TO DECIDE BUT

tJOT THE PRirJCIPAL AUTHOR

OF THE OPitliotJ;

SPEtJD LESS TJt1E OOifJG ROUTINE t·JRJTHJG ArlO EDITHJG;
CotlFEP.fUt!G

tJ~TH

OPitJiorJ Df{AFT

COLLEAGUES BEFORE CIRCULATIOtl OF AN

~lAS

AUT I !OREO

OVERALL, HE ASSESSED IT THIS \JAY:
/

"THE SECOtJD ATTORfiEY fiAS f1J\OE IT POSSIBLE TO DEVOTE
t10RE Tif1E TO THE :riiOGt1EriTAL ASPECTS OF t1Y JOR, AS
f!JSTit'GlJTSHEO FR0t1 THE POTE UC:RK OF fJTGESTTNG FA\TS, OOHJG
Bfl.SIC RESEARCH ArlO SO Otl.

JT I !AS ALSO G!\!Erl t1E t :or:E Tit 1E TO

EXAfHtlE APPEALS ASSIGtlED TO OTHER JUDGES.

ItJ ADOITiotJ IT

HAS GIVDl US A LITTLE r10RE CPPORTlJ!liTY TO DO CEf(T;\ItJ TI!JtJGS
l!E SI!OlJLD

m~~

DOiflG, DUT FOR \JHICH tiE llEVER SFE!1 TO HAVE

L!JOUGH TitlE:

rH-:1\DHJG 1\f)VldJCE Sl IFETS, 1./\\J f?EVInJ /I.RTTCLES,

UC.

/\1\f~I:N:>T

1:

n1 1<1.1 P

OF IJUI

Ci\:)1-~S

11 :1~ 1.t.l n . "
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PAGE 7

THE GOVEFWOP. 'S LAST OlJDGET AT TI-lE RE0lJFST OF THE
JUrrrriAL C0lHJC!L ASKED FOR FUtmS TO PROVIDE EACH APPELLATE
JUSTICE \JITH StJrH A POSITiml: TPJS liAS DELETED IrJ THE Rt!DGET
PP.OCE~S

HmJEVER.

(THE POSITIOrJS LAST 2 YEARS lJITH SALARY If JCREASE;
LOfJGER lJITHOUT FUTURE ItiCREASE OR A t10VE ItJTO A REGULAR
STAFF POSITION.)

CfJJTRAL STAFF

POLICY OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL

~!AS

BEEt! 1 FOR EACH 2

JUSTICES SH!I.E 197 5.

RAISES DEEP PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS. SirJCE THIS
CHEATES A BUREAUCRACY lJITH AN HJDEPE,tlDUJT LIFE OF ITS mJtJ.
NOT SUBJECT TO SAt lE RESPOI'JSIVEIJESS AS THE "ELBmJ CLERKS"

GOOD POST -.JlJDCf1UJT JtlTF:J:EST BILL TO REt lOVE /IJlY
Fir Ji\iJCTM_ Jf !CUJTIVE FOR A P/IFrfY TO
rCTf!,~r:rTI'I
-' ~
I

1 \

1

• _,

)'~'- ,: _-1 r, t .u 1_11 1

, \

__

~·

1

0
r~c-J-T\/f-~ .1 _ \' ~ 0
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OCTOBER 15. 1981
P;\GE 8

It1t1EOI ATE PPFP /\RATIOtl At JO FOI<I JAROitlG OF TRAllS\fUPTS
AtJD RECORD JfJ CRitUt!AL APPEALS lASES.

THE FIRST OISTRICT EARLIER THIS YEAR FOUND ITSELF
FACED

~liTH

A SUOST AtiTIAL BACKLOG OF CASES tJECESSITATHJG UP

TO A 22 110NTH DELAY Ir.J SOHE ItJST AtlCES.

THE PRESIDitJG Aot1HIISTRATIVE JUSTICE JOHtJ T.
RACAtJELLI REOUESTFD ASSISTANCE FRot1 THE CHIEF JUSTICE otJ
THIS 11/\TTEP..
IN RESPot:SE TO THAT REQUEST, tJITH THE COOPER/\ Tim!
OF THE ATTORtiEY GEtJEP.AL AriD THE STATE PURLIC DEFHIDER Cfl
CRit1ItiAL CASES. ArlO tJITH THE COOPERATIOtJ OF COUNSEL ItJ THE
CIVIL tiATTERS, APPROXIt1ATEL Y 100 CASES UERE TRI\flSFERRED TO
'

OTHER APPELLATE DIVISIONS t,JHERE TilE tJORKLOAD

~JAS

t10RE

t1AtlAGEAOLE.

:rtJ ADOITIOt!, tJitJE PRO- TH1 JUSTICES \JERF ASSIGrJED BY
THE CHIEF JIISTICE TO ASSIST TilE FIRST BEGJtHJJt!G
1981 AtJD Er!DitJG r:osnmER 1. 1ss1.

STAFF \!f\.S ALSO SlJPPLFl1UJTf-:D.
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~>EPTEI1B[f(

CLERK's CFFJCE SLJPPCfn

1.

WllFRIED J. KRAMER,

CLERK

ROBERT LISTON, CHIEF DEPVrY
MARY-lOUISE KING, OEPUTY
SUSAN WHITEACRE
D. BRUCE KORDENBROCK

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

C!!nurt nf Apprnl

LIBRARY AND COURTS BUILDING
914 CAPITOL MALL
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814
AREA CODE 916, ~77

APPEUA TE DISTRICT
STATE Of CAI.IFOINIA

Our Court is ins
a program designed to permit resolution
of certain civil appeals on an expedited basis. This program emphasizes reliance on
rather than traditional written briefs
as the primary vehicle
presentation of an appeal.
The premise underlying this program is that the Court does not
require full brie
cases
issues are straightforward
and can be del
and succinctly. Appellant's Opening
Brief and Respondent's
here 1
to a maximum of ten (10)
pages (in letter form if
excluding the statement of facts,
will serve three bas
purposes:
(a) allow counsel to know the
essence of the arguments to be
; (b) provide the Court with a
means of advance preparation, and (c) provide the framework for
oral argument. No Closing Brief
permitted. The Court believes
that this program
t faster, simpler, and less expensive
appeals without
the quality of judicial review and
decision.
Limited briefing addresses two problems which delay the resolution
of an appeal and
costs. First, it reduces the time
consumed and effort
in briefin~. Second, it
shortens the time between the close of briefing and oral argument,
thereby eliminating to a great extent the need for renewed preparation.
The oral argument
approximately thirty days
after the filing of
The argument itself is intended as an
session at which counsel assist the
informal and relative
sues. The Court expects to file its
Court's exploration
opinion within five to ten days
oral argument.
Participation
upon stipulations

program will be voluntary and will depend
counsel.

The program will operate as follows:
1. Only cases
which counsel have stipulated to the use of
the original record will be considered for participation in the program at this time.
2. The Court will identify appeals it considers appropriate for
the new procedures from those cases in which pre-argument statements
are filed; from those which are not resolved following settlement
conferences; and those cases in which a stipulation requesting the
new procedure is received and accepted.
3. Counsel for appellant will be responsible for obtaining
the required stipulations.
-1-
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4. Upon receipt of the stipulation, the Court will enter a
scheduling order setting forth the filing dates for the briefs,
and setting the date for argument. Appellant will have twenty
days from the order within which to file his/her brief. Respondent's brief will be due within twenty days of the filing deadline
for appellant's brief. No extensions of time for briefing will
be permitted. Argument Will be set for-approximately thirty-days
thereafter. In cases in which reporters' transcripts were ordered
and have not been filed, the scheduling order will be made when
the transcript is filed.
Any questions regarding the new procedures may be directed to
Wilfried J. Kramer, Clerk, (916) 445-4677.

-128-2-

nf <t!altfnmta

We
resolution as
agree to issuance
typewritten

considered for expedited
of invitation and
providing for filing of

(a) Appellant
(b) Respondent s
of appel
(c)

20 days of order;
after due date
1 be accepted.

No

We understand
that our briefs
statement
date for oral
the scheduling

will be granted and
, not including
order will set a
0 days from date of

Attorneys for Respondent
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The 6-month experin1ental pilot program for expea1t1ng
civil appeals is sponsored by the Action Commission to Reduce- · .,
Court Costs and Delay of the American Bar Association. our
·· CQurt is cooperating with the ABA in its implementation. Its
purpose is to reduce appellate court costs and delays in briefing_
and decision.. Our goal is to provide a written decision within
80-100 days after stipulation of counsel for expedited appeal.
Its application is limited to cases in which counsel stipulate
to lts use.
n.:~_ny briefs filed \7ith the ap!.)elln.te cou.rts are n~cdlessly
long.. Although there m<.1y b2 only 1 or 2 pivotal issues, attorneys
often add issues that are not ncccf;sax:y to proper review and
decision. A needlmctsly Jong opcn:i.ng b•:ief requires a needlessly
long respondent's brief and necdlc:;sly long staff memo. It results
in unnecessary work for the judges and staff. Issuance of a stipulated scheduling order limiting thl3 size and time for briefing and
setting a calendar date will, it is hoped, reduce the time, effort
and expenses of counsel in preparing briefs i:'.nd at the same time
reduce delay in resolution of the . lppeal. The Court intends to
J:cly n1ore heavily on oral :u:gument (as in the English system) and
hopes to file its ut~Ir,orandum opinio?- within 10 days after· oral
argu.h·mt.
'.l'he Notice to Conasel R.;garding Avaih~.bi.lity of Expedited Appeals
r?L()C:c:itu:cq, a copy of uhich you indica~·.c you have "~ lrcndy recc.i vcd,
rlc~rr:.1.::i.b~s the nmr p1:ncNlnre ln 1•1.orc~ de·i ail.
Du1:1ng February 1981,
•:unn~·<'l in 14 r.a!H~s h~;.ve ~:t:ipult:ltcd t.o is~>tF'nce of a :::chcduling Ol:der
~);_uvi.t15 l1iJ f:o:c c~::pe:c1J.t:<:d bd.et'ing..
The! e c<:'J;es ·oill he h;~ard on
;~<,:lcnd<\rS .in April l'..nd tliiy 1981.
'.l~hc

!'.nc;:d.c?m B<"r Jl..s:~oc5.rd:5.on ·l.s 1.11 k5.ng availnble to t:his Conrt
G· ·: 'Oa-i·h pe1·iod, n'e ru;~-:is~:; n ~e of a ntaff nt.tnx:·uuy ~ lnployed
L.y i.t bnt \.·.-,:..·J;.J ng <'l•d<"r "i:hc ro.11:t' 'i ; 11~ :::ru·i.fl.i.on.
~nr n
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IN AND FOR THE

0 APPELLATE DISTRICT

ted Appeal Program
August 4, 1981

1.

cases cal

to

a

te:

68

B.

c.

2.

Dates
April 20
May 4, 11,
June 1 22

Opinions fi

nt:

a

,

July 13, 20
August 3, 24
September 2, 21

20, 21

.

to

39

A.

Days from stipulation to filing
Average
71
Range: 4
6

B.

Leng
Aver
:
27
ltange:
4 5

c.

t (minutes)

oral argument to filing
6

D.

Fili s
April

July

Aug.

12

1

12

1

{pages)

E.

F.

ifi

G.

Opinions

B.

Cal.
rt Action
Bearing denied: 2
Bearing gran
: 0
Depublished:
0

I.

Staff calendar memorandum preparation (hours per case)
Average:
8
Range: 2.7 24.25
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r

for Publication:

6

on
:a

No.

3*
7
0

tu

Insur
Gov. Tort
Wr
ful
Real

i

TABLE 1
to August 4, 1981
Length of
Oral
Argument
(minutes)
42
35

41
29
23
23
27

44
31
6

50
9

25
29
75
15

602
237**

19
2

63

19925**
20283

21
46
56
22
27
++

0

19687
20 92
0 23
875
1 9 8
0 90
2 043
20 85
19996
20333
20375**
20421
20464
20512
20293
20271
20507

Lease
Es

1

Gov.Tort
Gov.Tort
Defamation
Cla
Sta
Insurance (
Conspi
{new
Conservatorsh
Sale Contr
Pers. Inju
Judgments
Real Prop
Insurance

Bearing deni
Opin
certi
+
sti

Appellant's
lation.
++
No appearance
included in aver
+++ No appearance
++++ Both brie
fi

Days from
Stip. to
opinion
filing
88
86
82

4

79
69
83

4
2
3
4

80
85
68
90
71
74
67
74
49+

40

28
10

4
7
7
6

96

23
2
4
7
7

84
84
64
53
76
63

70

26
4+++
26
31
25
21

7

12

63
59

63

20

7

8
1

37
9

4
2

77

15
16

Days from
argument
to opinion
filing

60
92
49
68
49
48++++
70
78
52
54
87
61

10
1
1
1
2
7
7
9
5
7
5
9
3
3
9
9

18
1

• Supreme Court.
ication.
fore settlement conference and
; respondent waived argument1 not
t: respondent answered court's question.
stipulation.
-132-

7/28/81
CIVIL CASES PENDING
(Records filed)
Expedited Pr
81

80

July

Sept.
Aug.

Nov.
Oct.

Jan.
Dec.

Mar.
Feb.

475

5

455
4

4

5

-133-

May
April

June

ram

IN THE

<!tnurt nf Apprul nf tqr §tutr nf Q!ulifnrntu
IN AND FOR THE

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

MEMO TO PRESIDING JUSTICE PUGLIA AND ALL ASSOCIATE JUSTICES:
There has been a dramatic decrease in total civil cases
pending since implementation of the new "Expedited Appeal Program."

1980
J;uly

- 436

The following statistics speak for themselves:

Aug.

TOTAL CIVIL CASES PENDING
1981
Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan.'" Feb. Mar.

431

439

445

446

468

483

480

476

Apr.

May

June

463

436

413

•
Wilfried J. Kramer, Clerk

Dated: July 13, 1981
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ESTIMATED TIME INTERVALS FOR PROCESSING APPEALS
(In Days)

.a.

Track A
of Appeal

1

of

1
fi

I

Record
Appeal)

1

')

~

5

Use
for

c.

&
1

r·

I

5

'

!
10

...0
1

t

ld

10

5

I
10

ignation of Record

10
25

I

Record Costs

55

of Estimated Costs

's & Reporter's Record Filed
's Transcript Filed
Conference Request
Pre-Argument Statement Piled
Statement Reviewof Expedited Appeal
ity
Expedited Review
Conference (30d)

6.5

20

's Memorandum Brief (20d)

20

~

~

r

30

~

~ 12f

I

135

I

145

_,

r
**
L

75

95

L

~

f

~

145

L

5!5

..,
i;

40

45

45

125

tten Opinion

20

I

I

ing Brief (60d)

r

20

65

125

I
60

'

'-

I

I

125

30

Negotiations Delay (60d) 120
's Memorandum Brief (20d)

0

I

Designation

Sup. Ct. Record Filed

1

1~5

I

r

2lS ** ~
-I
I

I

r

I'

1-

80
I
140

I

185
I
245

I
260
1

( 120) 130 (2l5) 29 0

Record-Settlement Conference (Successful) **
- Original Record-~xpedited Appeal
's & Reporter's Transcript-Settlement Conference (Success
Record-No Settlement Conference
Record-Settlement Conference (Unsuccessful)& Reporter's Transcript-No Settlement Conference
s & Reporter's Transcript-Settlement Conference (
Scheduling order would then be made when
total timA ·from 1111 ""'"' 1nc; ri"'"""

)

June 1, 1981

Expedited Appeals after 2 months or 1/3 of contract period.
In the past 8 weeks, 37 cases have been calendared on
this program. Thirty-five stipulations have come after settlement
conferences; in three cases counsel stipulated before the
settlement conference was held.
As of the end of today, the court will have heard oral
argument in 21 cases and filed opinions in 15. Only two cases
will not have met the 5-10 day from oral argument to filing
feature of the program; one missed by only one day. Relevant time
periods are summarized below:
Case No.

Subject & Posture of
Appeal

19973
19917
20150
20006
20063

Insurance (demurrer)
Gov.Tort Liab. (demurrer)
Wrongful death(demurrer)
Real Property (trial)
Gov.Tort Liab.(demurrer)
Gov.Tort Liab ... (order)
Workers• Comp.(sum.judg.)
Admin. Mandamus (writ)
Employ. Contract (trial)
Corp. Liquidation(order)
Community Prop. (order)
Real Prop. (trial)
Med. Malpr. (sum. judg.)
Insurance (trial)
Workers' Comp. (demurrer)

1995~

20364
20378
19626
19814
19778
19861
20365
20242
20191

Average

Length of
Oral
Argument
(minutes)

Days from
Stip. to
opinion
filing-

42
35
41
2923
23.
17
27
44
31
6
50
19
9
25

88
86
82
72
69
83
80
85
68
89
71
74
67
74
49*

28

76

* Appellant's brief filed before settlement conference.
Remaining Calendar Dates Scheduled Thus Far
June 22
July 13
July 20
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6 cases
6 cases
4 cases

Days from
argument
to opinion
filing
4
4
2
4
2
3
4
7
7
11
4
7
7
6
8

5

WRK

Q!nurt nf

UlltAI!'I' AND COimiS BUilDING
914 CAPITOl MAll
SACRAMENTO, '-"'•'""""''''""'

:prul

AREA COOE tl6,

~71

DISTRICT

From

examination
appellant's pre-argument
believes that
appeal would benefit from our new
which permits expedited decision based on filing of
memorandum briefs, limited to 10 pages, exclusive
statement of facts, followed by prompt oral argument and
memorandum opinion. Use of the new procedure is dependent
stipulation of counsel
It is appellant's responsibility to
the necessary stipulation.
The new procedure should permit resolution of an appeal with75-80 days after filing of the stipulation as contrasted with
the 14-15 months normally required. No extensions of time for brief:
would be ermitted. Failure by appellant to file his brief
t e t1me prov1 ed may result in dismissal of the appeal
further notice. Filing of the memorandum opinion is
within 5-10 days after oral argument.
If all counsel stipulate, a scheduling order providing as
will be entered:
(a) Filing of appellant's typewritten memo brief: 20 days
(b) Filing of respondent's ~ypewritten memo brief: 20 days
) Oral argument:
30 days
Please confer with opposing counsel and, if you wish to use
new procedure, return the enclosed stipulation to this
by
truly yours,
WILFRIED J. KRAMER, Clerk

Deputy Clerk

IN THE

<t!nurt nf Apprnl nf fl1r &tntr nf Q!nltfnnttn
IN AND FOR THE

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

3 Civil _ _ __

STIPULATION FOR EXPEDITED APPEAL AND
ISSUANCE OF SCHEDULING ORDER

We hereby request that this appeal be considered for
expedited resolution as described in the court's letter of
invitation and agree to issuance of a scheduling order
providing for filing of typewritten memorandum briefs as
follows:
(a) Appellant's opening brief within 20 days of order:
(b) Respondent's brief within 20 days after due date
of appellant's opening brief.
'VTe understand that no extensions of time will be granted
and that our briefs will be limited to 10 pages, not including
statement of facts, and that the scheduling order will set a
date for oral argument of approximately 70-90 days from date
of the scheduling order.

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent
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UIIAIY AND couatS ~
914 CN'ITOI. MAU
SA~O. CAI..Ii'OINIA 95114
lillflf.A c::oDE 916, ~

pprnl

JIJSAN WHilUCIE

D, !IIlJa ICIDENIIIOCK

DISTRICT

your
The court believes
new.procedure which permits
typewritten memorandum
the statement of facts,
memorandum
stipulation of
the

settlement conference
terminated. You are
brief is to be served
would benefit from our
decision based on filing of
to 10 pages exclusive of
prompt oral argument and
the new procedure is dependent
appellant's responsibility to

new procedure

resolution of an appeal
stipulation as contrasted
• No extensions of time for
briefing wou!a Se permitted
Failure-sy-appellant to file his
within the time provided may
t
dismissal of the
further
Filing
memorandum
within
after
argument.
7

0 dazs after
5 months

scheduling order providing as
of
Filing of
Oral argument:
new procedure,
office by

memo
20
memo brief: 20
and, if you wish to use
stipulation to this

,
J.

{

I

implemented to
those parts of the
necessary for the
In

~"'"I~"m" are
and
than traditional transcription, and their use could be explored. The Commission's recommendations address both what
and how. A program
on those recommendations
u,~..n.,...,,~ one or both areas, aJ.
sion of a CAT
component is not essential to the
Commission's program and would
probably depend upon its preexisting utilization by court reporters
in the implementing jurisdiction.
Many court rules provide for the
than full trial tranagreed statements
of the record. The issue
these
counsel in appro·
priate cases. A court should conshier the adoption of addit!onal
procedures designed to encourage
the utilization of transcript alternatives. These can include the establishment of presumptions in favor
of agreed statements or in favor of

with sanctions against
the preparation of
determined by the
be unnecessary to the ap-

Emphasis on

For~

- Court rules shouid be
providing for the use
briefs or memoranda
cases that do not require
briefing to raise and
issues involved in the appeaL
l'tit
underlying the limited brief is that a oourt does not
full briefing in certain
types of cases, e.s., where the issues are simple or routine, invoJvweU-settled issues of law
application to relatively
Ul'lii:Ornpiicated factual

33

are
which we are inhaving implemented are
to counsel prior to
of the issues of interest
and the circulation of
or draft opinions.
\-UUUIII~:I·IUII has been StUd)'·
adopted practice
the Superior Court in
which normally gives
ruling to attorneys beargument. Some form of
notification could be introa court either as part of a
package of procedural reor as a discrete modificawith the expedited appeals
these features may not
for all courts or for
In addition, while
potential benefits to
arguments. there may
be some less obvious effects.
if the court circua tentative decision or draft
will counsel seek the opto respond through the
of supplemental briefs?

CHAPPER is the Deputy
the Action Commishad predousl}" been Spe!o !he District of CoCounsel and has
D.C. Superior Court.
has served on a number
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